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abstract
 
This is a master's thesis concerning the origins, development
 
and infTuences of pragmatism in American culture. The term "pragmatism"
 
as used here refers to a formal system of philosophy.
 
It is primarily a work in the history of thought; thus putting
 
a greater stress on the origins and influences of pragmatism than on
 
the questions of truth and meaning.
 
It begins with C. S. Peirce and William James, followed by a
 
chapter on the reaction of their contemporary American philosophers,
 
JosiahRoyce and George Santayana. The third chapter is on pragmatism
 
and the. Progressive movement. This is one of the most important chapi
 
ters because so little has been done in the past to make explicit the
 
connection between these contemporary movements. The fourth chapter
 
shows the mature development of pragmatic theory brought about by
 
G. H. Mead and C. I. Lewis. Chapter five chronicles the political
 
agetation of John Dewey, contemporary with Mead and Lewis, during the
 
interwar years. Chapter six ends the thesis by pointing out some
 
further effects of pragmatism in religion, politics, the social sciences
 
and education. In the future,any of these areas would be fruitful for
 
research.
 
Qverall, it wilT be clear that the effects of the philosophy
 
of pragmatism are with us today--more so than most people realize.
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
 
Abstract
 
Chapter Page
 
1. 	THE ORIGINS OF PRAGMATISM: PEIRCE AND JAMES. . . . . . . . . 4
 
2. 	THE REACTION OF JOSIAH ROYCE AND GEORGE SANTAYANA
 
TO WILLIAM JAMES'S THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. . . . . .. . . . 25
 
3. 	PRAGMATISM AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 41
 
4. 	THE CHICAGO PRAGMATISTS: G. H. MEAD AND C. I. LEWIS. . . . . 61
 
5. 	JOHN DEWEY AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION . . . . . . . . 80
 
6. FURTHER INFLUENCES OF PRAGMATISM. . .102
 
FOOTNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .131
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . .154
 
CHAPTER 1
 
ORIGINS OF PRAGMATISM: PEIRCE AND JAMES
 
Conmentators often speak of Pragmatisni as the only original
 
American philosophy. This is surely debatable, and one would have
 
to qualify such a statement in several respects before it could be
 
come credible. HowWer, it is certain that Pragmatism was an original
 
American philosophy and that it was highly influential. As Will
 
Durant, who .is perhaps the most popular commentator on the history of
 
thought, has remarked:
 
The reader needs no guide to the new and the old
 
elements in this philosophy. It is part of the modern
 
war betv/een science and religion; another effort, like
 
Kant's and Bergson's, to rescue faith from the univer
 
salized mechanics of materialism. Pragmatism has its
 
roots in Kant's"practical reason"; in Schopenhauer's
 
exaltation of the will; in Darwin's notion that the
 
fittest (and therefore also the fittest and truest idea)
 
is that which survives; in utilitarianism, which measured
 
all goods in terms of use; in the empirical and inductive
 
traditions of English philosophy; |nd finally in the
 
suggestions of the American scene.
 
What all forms of Pragmatism have in common is an emphasis on
 
ends or results as Opposed to either means or first principles. There
 
is something particularly American about Pragmatism in Wi11iam James's
 
hands as he continually returns to the"cash value" of an idea. This
 
chapter will attempt to clarify how Pragmatism originated as an ob
 
scure methodology of the physical sciences under C. 3. Peirce and then
 
changed into a general philosophy under James. This change was both
 
crucial for its acceptance and indicative of popular American
 
 intellectual thought at that time. In the latter respect Josiah Royce
 
has given James the ultimate Hegelian compliment: "...Jaihes is an
 
American philosopher of classic rank, because he stands for a stage in
 
our national self-consciousness--for a stage with which historians of
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our national mind must always reckon."
 
recognized
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is universally
 
as the founder Of the pragmatic method. A good deal is known about
 
Peirce but, unfortunately, no one has as yet written his definitive
 
biography. Unlike James, his f^me is still in the process of emerging.
 
Rather, it has been the practice of most book-length works on his
 
philosophy to begin with a short essay on Peirce, the man;, as an intro
 
duction. There are almost no disagreements among them, only various
 
omissions. The following biographical information will follow pri
 
marily the essay by Paul Weiss found in Richard Bernstein s Perspec­
tives on Peirce (1965). The Weiss biography is taken as authori­
tative because he is also the co-editor of Peirce's Collected Papers
 
and has shown decades of interest in the man. All discrepancies or
 
major additions will be footnoted.
 
Charles Peirce was born in Cambridge, Massachusetts, the second
 
son of Benjamin Peirce, the foremost American mathematicicih of his time
 
and a professor at Harvard. Many of both Charles' strengths and weak
 
nesses are directly accountable to the fact that his father closely .
 
supervised his education, teaching him reading, writing, cind
 
(especially) mathematics, at home. According to Weiss, he also en
 
couraged his son's eccentricities and failed to teach him how to get
 
along in group situations.
 
Charles was precocious. He began the study of Ghemistry at the
 
age of eight, had set up his own laboratdry before he was a teenager,
 
mastered the latest books on logic on his own, and would invent code
 
languages and mathematical games for his playmates.
 
Later his father sent him to several private schools as a pre
 
paration for, Hafvard. It may be significant to note that they were all
 
local schools. Unlike James, Peirce did not have the benefit of study
 
abroad in his youth. Judging from Peirce's later involvement in the
 
classics of science, literature and logic, it may be speculated that
 
these schools stressed the "classical tradition," i.e., a proficiency
 
in reading literature in Greek, Latin, French and German. He entered ,
 
Harvard in 1855 and graduated in 1859--near the bottom of his class.
 
This may be attributed to the fact that he was young and only motivated
 
to work hard where his interest led him. It was as an undergraduate
 
that he read Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, three pages a night, until
 
he had it almost memorized.
 
In 1861 he joined the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey. Among
 
his greatest logistical achievements was to maneuver his work stations
 
so that he could continue studying and lecturing at the same time. He
 
held the job for thirty years. In 1862 he received an M.A. from Harvard
 
and in 1863 he received the first Sc.B. that Harvard awarded. It was in
 
chemistry and he got it summa cum laude. He spent six months studying
 
classificatiOh under Louis Agassiz at about the same time that James
 
also was studying under Agassiz. In 1864-1865 he lectured at Harvard
 
on the philosophy of science. It is iinportant to note that he came to
 
philosophy in a specialized way. He was looking for answers to speci
 
fic questions of logic and natural science.
 
He was forced to give up his lectureship at Harvard becuase of
 
a persona! dispute with the president. So, perhaps in order to stay
 
close to the'academic life, he became an assistant at the Harvard Ob
 
servatory. Research work that he did there between 1872 and 1875 led
 
to the only book he published in his lifetime. Photometric Research
 
{1878), He also did pendulum and gravity research, for which he gained
 
international fame at the time he was the first American delegate to
 
the international geodetic conference in France. Partly because of the
 
fame gained when his assertions about the non-uniformity of gravity were
 
proven, he was put in charge of the U. S. weights and measures in 1884
 
and sat as a member on international commissions for the same purpose.
 
He was the first to propose the wave length of a particular light ray
 
as a standard unit of measure, a procedure accepted today by all
 
countries on the metric system. (Since 1960, seventy years after his
 
proposal, one meter has been defined internationally as a certain mul
 
tiple of the wavelength of the orange-red line of krypton-86.)
 
The lack of a professorship was a large factor in keeping his
 
other works from being published. As A. J. Ayer says, "He thought of
 
himself primarily as a logician in a sense in which logic comprehended
 
the analysis of alT the processes of thought and inquiry into the con
 
ditions of their truth, rather than just the formal theory of valid
 
deductive reasdning."'^ He ariticipated "...Wittgenstein in the idea
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that the laws of logic had no "formal content. " He was the only
 
person until Schrdder to advance Boolian Algebra. Although he only
 
lectured a total of eight years at Harvard and Johns Hopkins and had
 
relatively few students one of them was Mrs. Christine Ladd-Franklin.
 
He anticipated the Principia Mathematica (1910-1913) of Bertrand
 
Russell and Alfred North Whitehead (under whom Christine Ladd-Franklin
 
did her doctorate). He also wrote on psychology, criminology, the his
 
tory of science, early English and classical Greek pronunciation,
 
Egyptology, did translations from Latin and German, prepared a thesau
 
rus and an editor's manual, and much more.
 
However, he was also handicapped by a number of difficulties
 
which kept him from the fame he deserved. First, he was a poor lecturer.
 
He had trouble making his thoughts and ideas clear to those who were not
 
as well educated as himself. Second, his extensive background and pen
 
chant for precision best suited him for a very advanced class, a position
 
to which he was never advanced in spite of his own and James's best
 
efforts. Third, his love life was scandalous; and this was something
 
no university of his time could afford to have its professors known
 
for. Fourth, he did not socialize well with others, especially his
 
superiors. According to W. B. Gallie, "Peirce seems never to have been
 
able to ge't on with anyone whom he did not greatly admire and who did
 
hot reciprocally admire him and treat him as an intellectual equal: in
 
particular he found it hard to get along with university presidents and
 
professors." Fifth, and ironically, he was simply not pragraatic in
 
his dealings outside the laboratory. His finances were as badly
 
managed as his love life. At one point he was forced to sell his pri
 
vate library, the best one oh logic in the United States, to Johns
 
Hopkins University in order to pay his debts• According to Gal 1i e,
 
Peirce in old age was considered a "hopeless eccentric" who would try,
 
"...to escape his creditors by working in a loft the ladder to which he
 
would pull up behind him. William James and his former students con
 
tributed to help him in the last years of his life. For this kindness
 
he adopted the middle name "Santiago" which means "St. James" in
 
Spanish. In summing up his idiosyncrasies one must conclude that he
 
did not live "pragmatically" in the sense which the term has today; he
 
either acted without regard to the consequences of his actions, or
 
simply was unable to calculate probable consequences based upon past
 
experience.
 
Concerning Peirce's pragmatism his commentators unanimously
 
credit the Cambridge "Metaphysical Club" as its origin or, at least,
 
the earliest direct influence on its operation. This may be overrated.
 
The "Metaphysical Club" was a fortnightly club of the early
 
1870's which met for the purpose of intellectual discussion. Its
 
usual format called for the reading of a paper by a member, followed
 
by a group discussion. Its most bri11iant;member was Chauncey Wright,
 
referred to as either a radical positivist or a naturalist, a man who
 
intensely enjoyed debating as a sport. AIT the other members looked
 
up to him and called him their "boxing master." Among those were
 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Fiske, William James, and the Benthamite
 
lawyer Nicholas St. John Creen. Green already had a leaning toward
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social jurisprudence and his effect upon the group is still an open
 
question.
 
According to most commentators,the entire group, with one ex­
ception, was "British-oriented." PeirCe, of course, was that exception.
 
If they had been educated in the Great Tradition then Peirce felt that
 
they had read it all with an English slant. He, on the other hand, was
 
more at home with classical and Gontiriental philosbphers, especially
 
Aristotle, John Duns Scotus, and immanuel Kant. Before the "Metaphysical
 
Club" first met he already considered himself a "Scotistic realist." He
 
q.' ' . ■ 
even claimed to be more of a realist than Scotus himself. Hence his 
unique education not only preceded his later group associations, but 
also directed his responses. He was an interloper in a group that was 
foreign to him. While William James was full of praise for contempor 
ary French philosophers, Peirce thought that the last French philos 
opher had been Descartes. If anything, the effect of the club was not 
to shape his views but, rather, to help him to articulate them. 
When Peirce gave papers for the club they were usually on the 
topic of logic, a subject of little interest to the other members who 
were interested in social philosophy, psychology, and jurisprudence. 
Peirce was unique in the group in that he was extremely well read in 
Medieval logic. Since his logical background was so esoteric com­
pareb to theirs. It is doubtful whether they could have been of much 
help to him in the discussions following his presentations. In fact, 
most of the club members including James thought of him as exceptionally 
odd.
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Fianlly when Peirce got around to framing pragmatic princi
 
ple in T877 (while on his way to a convention in France) it was long
 
after the club was defunct, and it was done for a subject directly re
 
lated to his work as a physicaT scientist. The principle was translated
 
from French into English a year later, but Hi11iam James did not pick
 
up the term for a full twenty years thereafter.
 
Peirceis; statement of the pragmatic principle reads as follows:
 
Gonsider the effects, which might have practical
 
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to
 
have. Then, our conception of these ejects is the
 
whole of our conception of the object.
 
Every word and comma of this was thought about and thoroughly intended
 
just es-it: reads;.
 
J. F. Boler contends that Peirce's pragmatism makes sense best
 
when it is used as a tool in a natural science. Understanding Peirce's
 
pragmatism is a matter of understanding its context. Boler says that,
 
"In general, a scientific hypothesis is not accepted because of where
 
■ 'i 12 '
 
it comes from but because of where it leads." Thus comes about
 
Peirce's emphasis on "ends," "consequences," "effects," and "practical
 
■ ■ ■ . 13 
bearings." "Pragmatism, in Peirce's hands was a logical..." as
 
Gallie says, and a tool of the natural sciences. Peirce is a thorough
 
philosophical realist and the objects of scientific knowledge are ob
 
jecti ve, true, and repeatable. According to Ayer, Peirce, unlike
 
James, did not equate a true proposition with one which is simply useful
 
to believe.^''^ Peirce's ''...pragraatismi'' according to Boler, "warns that
 
■■ :r..' ■; - 15
although we can dictate the questions, we cannot dictate the answers." 
12
 
In his professional work Peiree was a member of the worldwide community
 
of physical scientists. In his own study he was a member of the
 
Scholastic-Continental-Realist tradition of thought.
 
Unfortunately for Peirce, his method was not something v^hich
 
would work only for fellow realists. Instead he lived to see it changed
 
to serve ends which he never intended or even thought possible. Chief
 
among those who changed Peirce's intent was William James: in 19Q5
 
Peirce began calling his own method "Pragmaticism," a term "...ugly
 
enough to be safe from kidnappers." However, since James repeatedly
 
gave Peirce credit for originating "Pragmatism" Peirce's name has
 
stuck to it.
 
Today the term "pragmatism" is applied to philosophical nomin­
alists, those who are the polar opposite to Peirce. For instance, Paul
 
Boiler describes Justice Holmes' position as "legal pragmatism."^® To
 
understand how this change came about one must look directly to James.
 
The biography of William James (1842-1910) presents the opposite
 
problem from that of Peirce., First, there is far more material than can
 
be used conveniently in a work of this size and scope. Two such sources
 
are his letters collected and edited by his brother, Henry James, and
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his authoritative biography by G. W. Allen. There are several others;
 
some such as R. B. Perry's The Thought and Character of William James
 
runs two volumes in length. When James's own works are included the data
 
becomes massive. Only a very small part of this whole is needed for
 
the purposes of this work. The second drawback is that James's princi
 
pal and best known biographers often appear to.be "Jamesians." Either
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consciously or unconsciously they appear to present him as a sort of
 
intellectual hero and standard to be admired. On the other hand, his
 
detractors, such as Geprge Santayana and Mortimer Adler, are inclined
 
to take the opposite extreme. When there is still so much passion-

aroused by a philosophy it may be indicative that the issues James
 
treated are still alive today; that in a sense we are still a part
 
of the same age. In order to emphasize the "kidnapping," only a rel
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atively brief sketch of his biography is needed. The general chronology
 
uses G. W. Allen as the authority because he wrote one of the last bi
 
ographies on James (1967). Thus, he was able to synthesize the earlier
 
ones and to correct their errors.
 
As George Santayana puts it, "William James enjoyed in his youth
 
What are called advantages: he lived among civilized people, travelled,
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had teachers of various nationalities." The senior Henry James,
 
according to Bernard Brennan, was a rich eccentric: "In his utterances
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he adopted the role of prophet and mystic, denouncing church and state."
 
His Swedenborgian mysticism allowed him to hold views which in other
 
contexts would have been condemned as contradictory. He attended
 
Princeton Theological Seminary for two years after graduating from Union
 
College, but quit because he could not accept the doctrines of orthodox
 
Calvinism. Still he remained concerned with religion throughout his
 
life. This aspect of the father and its effect upon William cannot be
 
over emphasized. As A. J. Ayer sees it, logic stood in the way of
 
traditional religious arguments and it thus had to be shown that logic
 
did not compass the whole of reality. Ayer says:
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This is of fundamental importance to the under
 
standing of James's thought, since his desire to make
 
room for religious beliefs, without relaxing his in
 
tellectual standards or manipulating the evidence, was
 
also one of the principal motives for his pragmatism.

In particular, it strongly colore^2his interpretation
 
of the pragmatic theory of truth.
 
The senior Henry James, being independently wealthy, devoted his
 
life to being a professional student and to educating his children.
 
"This education," wrote Brennahi "was designed to minimize the influences
 
or) .
 
of institutions and grim traditions." The James children were contrn­
ually moved from continent to continent and from school to school in
 
order to broaden their backgrounds.
 
William James had been intereisted in art since childhood, and
 
in 1860 he attempted to pursue it as a career. Upon finding that he
 
was not cut out to become a painter he decided to attend Harvard. At
 
that time two of his brothers enlisted on the Union side in the Civil
 
War, but William held back for health reasons. He began, like Peirce,
 
as a chemistry major but changed to physiology. This scientific
 
training was the most rigorous he ever had and later helped hold in
 
check his tendency to make broad generalizations. Also, like Peirce,
 
one of his favorite professors at Harvard was Louis Agassiz, with whom
 
he later went on an expedition to Brazil. ;
 
From his background in physiology James turned to medicine and
 
received his M.D. from Harvard in 1869. He was in poor health all his
 
life but managed to be productive in spite of the fact. He never
 
practiced medicine, but instead, took up teaching anatomy and physiology
 
at Harvard in 1873. Two years later he taught his first course in
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psychology. His primary in the field at that time was in how
 
states of the body determine mental states--a normal reaction for a
 
person with his forma! training. By 1876 he was promoted to the secure
 
position of assistant professor of physiology at Harvard. Two years
 
later he married and signed a contract to produce a book on psychology.
 
His marriage was as nearly perfect as one could hope for and the
 
Principles of Psychology (1890), which took him more than ten years to
 
Write, is a classic and monumental work in its field. Even his detrac
 
tors admire it. His brilliant style of writing made even the dullest
 
subjects come alive. He wrote like a public speaker and, in fact,
 
most of his published works were originally delivered as speeches or
 
lectures.
 
While logic had led Peirce to philosophy, James was finally
 
led to it by physiology and psychology. Both logic and psychology at
 
that time were still properly regarded as divisions of philosophy. It
 
is worth noting that neither Peirce nor James had much early or formal
 
training in philospphy. Rather, both were primarily concerned with
 
solving problems presented to them from their own particular disciplines.
 
The philosophers whom each chose to read were those who offered possible
 
solutions to those problems.
 
Between the time James received his M. D. and started teaching
 
he suffered a mental breakdown. Perhaps a reason for this can be found
 
in the tension between his upbringing and his education; his emotion
 
and his intellect. He could not bear the thought of a deterministic
 
universe, and yet, that was the only sort of world that his studies
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had taught him to believe In. By reading Wordsworth and Charles
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Renouyier he managed to recover from his mental crisis. Yet
 
intenectually he still remained a determinist. When teachrng psychol
 
ogy he reversed what is normally considered the mental cause-and­
effect sequence. Saying;
 
...that the bodily changes follow directly the
 
PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling
 
of the same Changes as they occur IS the emotion.
 
...we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we
 
strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry,
 
strike or tremble, because we are sorry, angry or
 
fearful as the case may be.
 
The neural machinery is but a hyphen between de
 
terminate arrangements of matter outside the body and
 
determinate impulses to inhibition or discharge within
 
its organs. When the hen sees a white oval object on
 
the ground she cannot leave it; she must sit upon it
 
and return to it, until at last its transformation
 
into a little mass of inoving chirping down elicits
 
from her machinery an entirely new set of perform­
■	 ances. ­
He immediately goes from there to describe and account for human actions
 
in the same biologically compulsive manner. By 1890 he still said:
 
I now proceed to the most vital point of my whole
 
theory, which is this: If we fancy some strong
 
emotion, and then try to abstract from it al1 the
 
feelings of its bodi1^ s^ymptomSi we find nothing left
 
behind, no "mind-stuff" out of v;hich the emotion can
 
be constituted, and that a cold neural state of in
 
tellectual perception :is al1 that remains. (Italics
 
James') ,
 
This is from the Principles of Psychology. In the same work he held
 
that the seat of thq human "self" is located in the muscles of the face
 
■ ■ ■ 27 ■. ■ I. .:--:-. 
and throat. 	 J 
Perhaps the key tcl uhderstanding James is to know that he held 
17 
contradictory beliefs. Again, he was raised one way and then educated
 
another. His Swedenborgian father taught freedom and humanism. Often
 
Ralph Waldo Emerson was a guest in their house. James was basically
 
religious and, yet, he had received the latest scientific education.
 
"Science" reduced literally everything to the laws of material cause
 
and effect, to nothing but matter in motion.
 
Santayana says that, "There was a deep sense of insecurity
 
about him. He wanted to embrace both the world of "science" (as
 
he knew it) and of traditional human values at the same time. James
 
was extremely sensitive to the predicaments of the philosophy of his
 
age, and had the gift of being able to make them alive to others. James
 
was utterly appalled by the idea of a mechanistic universe and most of
 
all by the automaton theory of mind. He thought that while the deter
 
ministic scientific theories were basically true man still must be a
 
free and moral agent. As W. B. Gallie says:
 
...But though he felt this to be so, he lacked the
 
logical power to see and say clearly why it was so: and
 
the main thread of his philosophical development consists
 
in his persistent efforts to find philosophical justifi
 
cations for his initial feeling or hunch against current
 
materialistic doctrines. To this end he welcomed a|^
 
from the most diverse quarters. (Emphasis Gallie).
 
A. J. Ayer says William James,
 
...sought the advantage of being tough-minded with
 
regard to any questions of natural fact; and tender-

minded with,respect to morals and theology. What
 
attracted him to Pragmatism was that it seemed to him
 
to make both possible.
 
It permitted him to have the best of both worlds, to hold contradictory
 
beliefs at once, to reconcile what for James was equivalent to the
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problern of theodicy. This is a use for the pragraatic method which made
 
Peirce, the logician, unhappy. In truth, when James listened to
 
Peirce lecture he confessed that he did not understand him and later
 
made his famous description of Peirce as, "flashes of brilliant light
 
revealed against Cimmerian darknessl" According to Gallie, James's
 
...Openly anti-intellectualistic teachings stand
 
in definite opposition to the intellectual temper of
 
Peirce." ■ ■ , ■: i; "
 
But, unlike Peirce, James was never greatly in­
fluenced by the spirit of the laboratory and never
 
drawn to reflect closely on its methods. ...Moreover^
 
and here again he stands in marked constrast to Peirce,

James confessed himself"mathematically imbecile" and
 
"a-iogical if not illogical," arid in one of his las^2
 
books he publicaliy and solemnly "renounced logic."
 
Peirce's great weakness lay in moral and aesthetic philosophy. 
He was primarily a physical scientist and a logician and probably would 
never have achieved popular fame. James, on the other hand, had a life 
long interest in all types of value theory—especially religion--and it 
was religion that was in a time of crisis in the United States. Thus 
he was preoccupied with a field which held the public interest, and did 
so in the strongest of ways. Any breakthrough in this area which 
supported tradition, security or "common sense" was bound to gain 
immediate recognition. 
James's unique contribution was to combine epiphenomenal ism 
with religion. In his Pragmatism; A New Name for Some Old Ways of 
Thinking (1907) he said: "'The True,' to put it very briefly, is 
only the expedient in our way of thinking, just as 'the right' is only 
the expedient in our way of behaving." (Emphasis James). In the 
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same Work he said that, "On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of 
" ■ ' ■ ■ 34 ■God works satisfactorily enough, it is true." Although he goes on to
 
^ 35''
 
claim that he believes in higher forms of consciousness, such gods
 
would still have a material basis, standing to us as we do to our cats
 
and dogs.
 
James, as a psychologist, thought that emotion or "temperament"
 
was primary in directing the human power of reason. If all thought
 
is epiphenomena, then so is reason. Human needs become drives that
 
dictate what is looked for or thought about. He was sensitive to too
 
many varieties of philosophical experience to believe, or put his
 
faith in, any of them as reflections of Truth or Reality. He was fond
 
of the Hegelian, Josiah Royce, as a friend and as a disputant, but he
 
certainly never believed in the Absolute or in any such systematic
 
philosophy. Rather, for James the "true" was equated with the useful,
 
not with a correspondence theory of reality. In a truly pluralistic
 
universe there are infinite-possibilities. Ayer claims that he was
 
reacting against the logic of the neo-Hegelians.37 However, Ayer
 
also recognizes that James's "radical empiricism" stressed the impor
 
tance of even the subjective sensations and needs, such as religion.
 
Religibn is useful. He was a subjectivist and a thoroughgoing nomin
 
alist. Needs and sensations are certainly real at one level, even
 
though they are epiphenomenal and not objective. "Thus, for James,"
 
says Ayer, "it is an essential characteristic of religion and moral
 
theories that their role is to satisfy our emotional and practical
 
demands.
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This is the use to which James put his pragmatism in "The Will
 
to Believe," a use which Peirce called "suicidal." This remark is
 
quoted by Ayer who agrees that it is a completely unwarranted extension
 
on
 
of Peirce's pragrnatism. He says further that,"Quite apart from the
 
quality of their respective philosophical equipments, Peirce and James
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were antithetical intellects."
 
"The Will to Belieye"^^ (1896), originally delivered as an
 
address before the Philosophical Clubs of Yale and Brown Universities,
 
probably did more to make James's fame than anything else. This is the
 
most concrete instance of his advocating a position rather than just
 
making an analysis or a description. His main adversary is William
 
. 4?
 
Kingdom Clifford who, in"The Ethics of Belief" (1879), had defended
 
the point that men ought only to hold those beliefs which they have ex
 
amined and of which they are reasonably sure. This was a moral imper
 
ative because one's beliefs represent tendencies or predispositions to
 
actions-^and actions affect others. Darwin and the whole age of natural
 
science had made the traditional beliefs in God untenable to such a
 
rational person as Clifford. Men such as Thomas Huxley and Herbert
 
Spencer were extending the scope of Darwinian science so as to supersede
 
religion altogether, to unmask it all as mere unscientific superstition.
 
James fearlesSly--and perhaps foolishly--went into battle with
 
both Thomas Huxley and William Clifford. He called the latter an
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enfant terriblea accused him of not recognizing his own passional
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nature, and opted for Pascal's phrase, "Le coeur a ses raisons que 
■ ■■ 45 ■ ■ ■ ■ ' 
la raison ne connait pas." True beliefs are those which are useful
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or profitable ones, even if contradictory and regardless of ultimate
 
reality. More still, for James, in the case of future events faith
 
can actually create its own desired end or object. This is the pragmatic
 
value of fatth. He says:
 
...The desire for a certain kind of truth here brings
 
about that special truth's existence; and so it is in in
 
numerable cases of other sorts. Who gains promotions,
 
boons, appointments, but the man in whose life they are
 
seen to play the part of live hypotheses, who discounts
 
them, sacrifices other things for their sake before they
 
have come, and takes risks for them in advance: His faith
 
acts on the powers above him as a claim, and he creates
 
its own verification.
 
...There are, then, cases where a fact cannot come at all
 
unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming. And where
 
faith in a fact can help create the fact, that would be an
 
insane logic,which should say that faith running ahead of
 
scientific evidence is the "lowest kind of ihmorality" into
 
which a thinking being can fal1. Yet such is the logic by
 
which our scientific absolutists pretend to regulate our
 
livesI (Emphasis James)
 
There is something powerful and inspiring about this on a
 
religious level. It should make one think back to James's Sweden­
borgian father. Yet it is easy to see how Peirce, the logician and
 
philosophical realist, called it "suicidal." WilT^'faith in the exis
 
tence of God "create the fact"?
 
No; but allowing people to believe in virtually anything will
 
ehcourage experimentatibn and "progress." It may be speculated that
 
what James really wanted to do was to free human action from the bonds
 
of either scientific or religious restraint.
 
James accepted the inverse of the traditional relationship
 
between logic and reality: for Peirce a true theory would work in
 
practice, its prior truth ensuring its subsequent workability;
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whereas for James whatever "worked" was the highest evidence of a true
 
theory. For this James has been criticized by every major logician of
 
our time including RusseTl, Whitehead and Ayer. However, Royce
 
appears ultimately to be right: James seemed fo embody the intellec
 
tual spirit of his age and the public loved him for it. He was widfJ^
 
accepted in spite of his faults and in spite of the shouts of those who
 
pointed out his logical absurdities. He appeared as a wise old man who
 
offered salvation from a mechanistic and deterministic science.
 
■ ■■ ■ • . ■ ■ ■ ■ " ■ , , : ' A ■ ■ 
On the other hand, contemporary materialists, such as George
 
Santayana were revolted. Santayana said,
 
...when his book on Pragmatism appeared, about the
 
same time as- my Life of Reason, it gave me a rude shock.
 
I could not stomach that way of speaking about truth;
 
and the continual substitution of human psychology-­
normal madness, in my vieW'—for the universe, in which ,
 
man is but one distracted and befuddled animal, seemed
 
to me a confused remnant of idealism^ not serious.
 
The William James who had been my master was not
 
William James of the later years, whose pragmatism and
 
pure empiricism and romantic metaphysics have made such
 
a stir in the world.
 
Later, Herbert Schneider said,
 
William James, the most religiously empirical of
 
them all, was catholic in his sympathies precisely be
 
cause he was protestant in his interests. Having
 
achieved for himself an irreligious "healthy-mindedness"
 
after years of struggle, he was free to extend the
 
broadest sympathy to "sick sou1s." His Varieties of
 
Religious Experience [1902] is therefore not an ob-^
 
jective account of religion, but a clinical diagnosis
 
of religious diseases. The sicker the soul the better
 
it suited him, for such cases admirably illustrated
 
his philosophy of consciousness.
 
Perhaps Schneider understood James better than did Santayana. James
 
appears to agree with Marx. Dogmas are connected with restrictions;
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restriction create an unnatural condition, or sickness, in an acting
 
being; and the conscious manifestation of Such a condition is religion.
 
In his last work. The Meaning of Truth; A Sequel to 'Pragmatism'
 
(1909), James tried to defend himself from the attacks of the profes
 
sional intellectuals, those who accused him of simply trying to make
 
people feel good. In the preface he said,
 
I had supposed it to be matter of conmon observa
 
tion that, of two competing views of the universe which
 
in all other respects are equal, but of which the first
 
denies some vital human need while the second satisfies
 
it, the second will be favored by sane men for the sim
 
ple reason that it makes the world seem more rational.
 
To choose the first view under such circumstances would
 
be an ascetic act, an act of philosophic self-denial of
 
which no normal human being would be guilty. Using the
 
pragmatic test of the meaning of concepts, I had shown
 
the concept of the absolute to mean_ nothing but the hol
 
iday giver, the banisher of cosmic fear. One's objective
 
deliverance, when one says 'the absolute exists' amounted,
 
on my showing, just to this, that 'some justification of
 
a feeling of security in the presence of the universe'
 
exists, and that systematically to refuse to cultivate a
 
feeling of security would be to do violence to a tendency
 
in one's emotional life which might well be respected as
 
prophetic. (Emphasis James).
 
My treatment of 'God,' 'freedom,' and 'design' was
 
similar. Reducing, by the pragmatic test, the meaning of
 
each of these concepts to its positive experiencable op
 
eration, I showed them all to be the same thing, vis.,
 
the presence of 'promise' in the world. 'God or no God?'
 
>	 means 'promise or no promise?' It seems to me that the
 
alternative is objective enough, being.a question of
 
whether the cosmos has one character or another, even,
 
though ouK own personal answer may be made on subjective
 
grounds.
 
What is significant is that he virtually accepted his critics'
 
charges, but without allowing that they proved him wrong. Unlike his
 
older contemporary, Karl Marx, James was perfectly happy that the people
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should have an opiate in religion. Religion provided (or justified)
 
ideals which most men could not arrive at through their intellects.
 
If men were unlimited potentials in a process of evolution, then re
 
ligious ideals might provide the blueprints for them to evolve into
 
gods.
 
Henry Steel Conmager says of pragmatism, "Because it taught
 
that men hold the future in their own hands, it was drenched with
 
optimism. However, he also says that, "Of all the philosophies
 
to which Americans have subscribed, pragmatism lent itself most unavoid­
rp
 
ably to vulgarization." Such "...a philosophy sponsored by democracy
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suffered the consequences of that sponsorship." This will become
 
apparent before the reader has finished.
 
 CHAPTER 2
 
THE REACTION OF JOSIAH ROYCE AND GEORGE SANTAYANA 
■ ■ ■ ■ TO'- . 
WILLIAM JAMES'S THEORY OF SELF AND CONSCIOUSNESS 
The purpose of this chapter is to show the relationship of
 
James's pragmatism to the other dominant philosophies of his time,
 
idealism and materialism. Josiah Royce is used as the representative
 
Hegelian Idealist, and George Santayana the spokesman forclaSsical '
 
materialism. These philosophers were chosen because they were James's
 
popular contemporieS, knew him personally, and often made reference
 
to him in their vvfitings. James's theory of the self and of conscious^
 
ness is Stressed because it is central to both his pragmatism and that
 
of the next generation.
 
In 1880 Josiah Royce wrote to James saying:
 
In each moment we construct such a world because we
 
are interested in doing so. The final basis of our
 
thought is ethical, practical. These things are so
 
because a given moment of activity must have them so.
 
'Give me a world' is the cry of consciousness; and
 
behold, a world is made even in the act of crying.
 
—Some of this you will, I think, agree with; some
 
of it at all events I have learned from or through
 
you.
 
In an essay written two years later Royce says:
 
Change the book you are reading, and your whole
 
notion of the universe suffers some momentary change
 
also. ...Your change of attantio^ qualitatively al
 
ters your apprenhension of truth.
 
At every moment we are not merely receiving, atten
 
ding, and recognizing, but we are constructing. Out of
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what from moment to moment comes to us, we are building
 
up our ideas of past and future, and of the world of
 
reality. Mere dead impressions are given. We turn them
 
by our own act into symbols of a real universe. We thus
 
constantly react upon what is given, and not only modify 2
 
it, but give it whatever significance it comes to possess.
 
Definite belief in external reality is possible only
 
through this active addition of something of our own to
 
the impressions that are actually given to us. No exter
 
nal reality is given to us in the mere sense-impressions.
 
What is outside of us cannot be at the same time within
 
us. But out of what is in us, we construct an idea of an
 
external world; and we ourselves give to this idea all
 
the validity that for us it can ever have.
 
Interestingly, Royce puts even more stress upon the consequen
 
tial aspect of reality than James. The fact that we actively choose
 
which aspects of given experience to make significant makes us ulti
 
mately responsible for our beliefs and, thus, for the world which we
 
create. In this respect Royce sides much more closely with Clifford
 
than with James. Even though Royce, in a letter to C. S. Pelrce,
 
' 5
described James as "...my most intimate friend outside my ownfamily,"
 
he was quite willing to criticize James for his lack of responsibility.
 
From James's position the will to believe is primary for an acting
 
being; it is an extension of the will to live; but, since It Is so
 
primary or biologically based, it precedes consciousness. The activ-.
 
itles of a conscious individual are the results of h|s prior beliefs.
 
In order to create his beliefs, to create himSelf, an individual
 
would have to exist before he existed, would have to create himself
 
before he was created. Rather, for James, It is the body which
 
creates consciousness.
 
In 1882, fourteen years before James first delivered "The
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Will to Believe" as a lecture, Royce wrote of him:
 
A person for whose opinions I have much respect once
 
said to me that he disclaimed all responsibility for the
 
beliefs that he held on certain very important matters.
 
'I try,' said he, 'to conquer prejudice; but having
 
done this, I can do no more. My belief, whatever it is,
 
forms itself In me. I look on. My will has nothing to
 
do with the matter. I can will to walk or to eat; but
 
I cannot will to believe. I might as well will that my
 
blood should circulate.'
 
Despite his disclaimer, I thought, and yet think,
 
that he has made his beliefs very much for himself,
 
and that these beliefs do him honor,gas the statue does
 
honor to the artist that chisled it.
 
Royce could not bring himself to believe that James's beliefs had been
 
fashioned from"wholly passive matter." He reflected that the powers
 
of material circumstance were great, but continued:
 
But my friend was a man of energy, and controlled
 
the current of his thought. He fought hard...and he has
 
so far conquered as to be the master of a very manly and
 
many-sided system of doctrine. I think him responsible
 
for this sysitem.... As a man is, so he thinks.
 
Royce finds his solution to, James's problem through a sort of
 
Kantian approach to what is good in itself--a good will. There is an
 
ambiguity in the term "will": at one time it can mean a drive and at
 
another a choice, often both together. James uses it as a drive, a
 
force, or a motive power. Royce uses It as a selective force. He
 
says: ^ '
 
...attention, in its most elementary forms, is the
 
same activity that, in a more developed shape, we call
 
will. We attend to one thing rather than another, be
 
cause we will to do so, and our will is here the
 
elementary impulse to know. Our attention leads us at
 
times into error. But this error is merely an accom
 
paniment, the result of our will activity. We want to
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tntensTfy an Tmpression, to bring it within the sphere
 
of knowTedgb. But in carrying out our impulse, wo do
 
more than we meant. We not only bring something into
 
clearer consciqusness that Was before out of clear con-

consciousness, but we qualitatively:modify this thing by
 
attending to it. .,.Attention seems to defeat, in part,
 
its own object. Bringing something into the field of
 
knowledge seems to be a modifying, if not transforming,
 
. ■ jj'proces:s..; ^ - .-j. 
For Royce the ultimate basis of the self is the will. It
 
exists from birth, is itself a force with choice and, thus, responsi
 
ble,: both morally and causally, for creating or manifesting itself.
 
Plainly,isince active inner processes are forever
 
modifying and building our ideas; since our interest
 
in what we wish to find does so much to determine what
 
we find; since we could not if we would, reduce purselves
 
to mere registering machines, but remain always builders
 
of our own little worlds--it becomes us to consider well,
 
and to choose the spirit in which we shall examine our
 
experience. : Every one is certain to be prejudiced,
 
simply because he does not merely receive experience,
 
but himself acts, himself makes experience. The great
 
question for every truthseeker is, in what sense, to
 
what degree:,:with what motive, for what end, may r and
 
should I be prejudiced?
 
Royce can avoid the problem that James poses because of the difference
 
between potential and actual existence. The will is an actualizing
 
force, in a sense a potential for actualizing since it does not act
 
with mechanical necessity. It is a potential force for creating itself
 
in actuality, and, as such, is responsible'for the attitude that it
 
adopts in the process, j
 
Unlike James's self, which is the epiphenomena of the movements
 
of his mouth and throat, Royce's conscious self might be described as
 
the creation of his will. Even though speech is important for the
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development of a distinctively human mind, Royce finds that "Thought
 
has other modes of expression than through the forms of speech.
 
For instance, creative actions.
 
Royce may be credited with anticipating the pragmatlsts
 
Thomas Cooley and G. H. Mead with the concept of "the significant
 
other" in the emergence of the self. This is not surprising in view
 
of the fact that significant perceptions and interpretations were the
 
data by which Royce's will created its (actual) existence. It creates
 
itself in its relationship to other selves and, secondly, as over
 
against the brute facts which function as matter. Royce says:
 
A man is conscious of himself, as a finite being,
 
only in so far as he contrasts himself, in a more or less
 
definite social way, with what he takes to be the life,
 
and, in fact, the conscious life, of some other finite
 
being.... Our conception of physical reality is secon
 
dary to our conception of our social fellow-beings, and
 
is actually derived therefrom.
 
Thus not only does the self learn to define itself in its interaction
 
with other selves, but it is also the case that most of what is taken
 
for physical reality is, in fact, a matter of convention. "Matter"
 
is understood socially or conventionally.
 
According to J. H. Cotton, "Without our Neighbors we simply
 
would not be aware of ourselves as selves at all. Such is the thesis
 
■ 12 
of Royce." Why, then, did not Royce get the credit for a theory
 
that went to Cooley and Mead? Unknowingly, Cotton provides the answer
 
when he says: "Royce has a way of saying that our estimate of our
 
selves depends upon what others think of us, or upon what we believe
 
others ought to think. But these are by no means identical. For in
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our belief about what our neighbors 'ought' to think of us, we retain
 
13 •
 
our own measure of independent judgment." For Mead, the pragmatist
 
and "social behaviorist," there is no independent existence (socially
 
speaking) and certainly no independent judgment.
 
Another area in which Royce took James to task was over the
 
knowledge of other selves, the conscious states of others. Royce says,
 
"There can be no direct perception of other minds. For this general
 
reason, 'working hypotheses' about the interior reality which belongs
 
to the mind of my neighbor can never be 'converted into the cash of
 
existence'. James was forced to resort to analogy, and Royce says
 
that this is "...fatal to the whole pragmatic theory of knowledge.
 
. . . 15
 
Surely an argument from analogy is not its own verification."
 
Royce missed the chance to attack the argument from analogy as wholly
 
improper under these circumstances: it is suitable for judging an
 
unknown individual case by reference to the well known general case;
 
but in the case of the conscious states of others it is applied from
 
the basis of only one known case (the individual who is directly con
 
scious of only himself) to over a billion unknown cases. Still,
 
Royce's point is well taken.
 
Royce's solution is to use the criterion of coherent new informa­
1fi
 
tion as the sure sign of another mind. There is a dialogue; new
 
ideas are communicated by means of symbols; and it all depends upon a
 
continuous series of mutual interpretations.^^
 
As early as 1881 Royce expressed agreement with James that there
 
was no "mind-stuff." For James there was nothing independent of
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matter, and for Royce there was nothing, no "stuff," independent of
 
consciousness. In an interesting way, their radical positions were
 
rather compatible on this issue; It was James's treatment of the
 
objectivity of the given of consciousness which bothered Royce. Royce
 
wrote a letter to him that year saying:
 
There is just one doubt in much that you say about
 
the general definition of reality: Do you or do you
 
not recognize this reality to which you speak as in its
 
known or unknown forms independent of the knowing con
 
sciousness? Sometimes you speak as if "Sentiment" were
 
all, sometimes as if there were something above the
 
"Sentiment" to which the latter conformed For me
 
the sentiment of reality, the determination to act thus
 
and so, the expectation of certain results, all these _ ig
 
facts of consciousness absolutely no transcendent reality.
 
For Royce the data of consciousness is objective, upheld by the Absolute.
 
Whereas James and Royce were best friends and their philos
 
ophies were compatible in practice (with Royce from time to time calling
 
himself and Absolute pragmatist), there was little or no good feeling
 
between James and Santayana. In fact, Santayana was one of the only two
 
students in his entire career that James actively disliked. (The other
 
was Theodore Roosevelt.) For his part, Santayana began his professional
 
studies with the rigors of "Catholic philosophy" (presumably Thomism)
 
and detested James's lack of system, precision and certitude.
 
Santayana had a difficult time saying anything about James
 
that was not in some way demeaning. He says that James had an "...ir
 
regular education; he never acquired that reposeful mastery of particular
 
authors and the safe ways of feeling and judging which are fostered in
 
great schools and universities."IQ He could not stand James's apparent
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Tack of consistency. However, he knew it to be a part of his method. 
He said that, "In^^ f^ Jdmes was consistent enough, as even Emerson 
' 20 (more extreme in this sort of irresponsibility) was too." Continuing,
 
Santayana claims that "His excursions into philosophy were accordingly
 
in the nature of raids." Santayana believed that James's popularity
 
rested upon his poorer works--The Mill to Believe, Pragmatism and The
 
Varieties of- Religious Experience—rather than on his best work. The
 
Principles of Psychology.
 
Although James's psychology was his most scholarly and well
 
researched work, Santayana saw that it gave a cTue to later direc
 
tion. According to Santayana, James did not dare to accept the conclu
 
sions of his own research because they would have pointed to a mechanis
 
tic universei
 
He preferred to believe that mind and matter had
 
independent energies and could lend one another a hand,
 
matter operating by motion and mind by intention. This
 
dramatic, amphibious way of picturing causation is
 
natural to common sense, and might be defended if it
 
were clearly defined; but James was insensibly carried
 
away from it by a subtle implication of his method.
 
This implication was that experience or mental discourse
 
not only constituted a set of substantive facts; all
 
else, even the material world which his psychology had
 
postulated, could be nothing but a verbal or fantastic
 
symbol for sensations in their experienced order. So
 
that while nominally the door was kept open to any hy
 
pothesis regarding the conditions of the psychological
 
flux, in truth the question was prejudged. The hypoth
 
eses, which were parts of this psychological flux, could
 
have no object save other parts of it. That flux itself,
 
therefore, which he could picture so vividly, was the
 
fundamental existence. The sense of bounding over the
 
waves, the sense of being on an adventurous voyage, was
 
the living fact; the rest was dead reckoning. Where
 
one's gift is, there will one's faith be also; and to this 22
 
poet appearance was the only reality. (Emphasis Santayana).
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Santayana says that, "I think it important to remember, if we are not
 
to misunderstand William James, that his radieal empiricism and his
 
pragmatism were in his mind only methods; his doctrine, if he may be,
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said to have had one, was agnosticism." Santayana defines James'
 
agnosticism as"...feeling instinctively that beliefs and opinions,
 
if they had any objective beyond themselves, could never be sure they
 
had attained it. Thus Santayana felt that James was philosoph
 
ically shallow and a subtle form of religious hypocrite:
 
All faiths were what they were experienced as being,
 
in their capaGity of faiths; these faiths, not their Ob
 
jects, were the hard facts we must respect. We cannot
 
pass, except under the illusion of the moment, to any
 
thing firmer or on a deeper level. There was accordingly
 
no sense of security, no joy, in James's apology for per
 
sonal religion. He did not really believe; he merely
 
believed in the right of believing that you might be right
 
if you believed.
 
It is this underlying agnosticism that explains an
 
incoherence which we might find in his popular works....
 
Professedly they are works of psychological observation;
 
but the tendency and suasion in them seems to run to dis
 
integrating the idea of truth, recommending belief with
 
out reason, and encouraging superstition.
 
Santayana finds that James had no ultimate basis—no ground at all—for
 
claiming that his fine psychological observations were not "instances
 
of delusion." Santayana deplored the lack of basis for a"judicial
 
attitude."
 
In The Varieties of Religious Experience We find
 
the same apologetic intention running through a vivid
 
account of what seems for the most part (as James ac
 
knowledged) religious disease. Normal religious exper
 
ience is hardly described in it. Religious experience,
 
for the great mass of mankind, consists in simple faith
 
in the truth and benefit of their religious traditions.
 
But to James something so conventional and rationalistic
 
seemed hardly religious; he was thinking only of irruptive
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visions and feelings as interpreted by the mystics who
 
had them.
 
Santayana ioompared James's study of religion in The Varieties to a
 
surgeon who could guarantee the success of his operation, but not
 
the life of the patient. He compared James's Will to Believe to
 
Pascal's Wager, and shows it to be fallacious for the same reasons:
 
first, there are a multitude of choices, not just two alternatives;
 
second, the motive is base:
 
...such a wagers-betting on the improbable because
 
you are offered big odds—is an unworthy parody of the
 
real choice between wisdom and folly. There is no heaven
 
to be won in Such a spi^^t, and if there was, a philos
 
opher would despise it.
 
To be boosted by an illusion is not to live better
 
than to live in harmony with the truth; it is not nearly
 
so safe, not nearly so Sweet, and not nearly so fruitful.
 
These refusals to part with a decayed illusion are really
 
an infection of the mind. Believe certain^^; we cannot
 
help believing; but believe rationally....
 
Note, however, the phrase^ "we cannot help believing." In
 
this much Santayaha agrees with James, The difference is that Santayana
 
is a type of phiTosophical realist: there is but one objective reality,
 
and only it is worthy of human belief--the universe is not plural.
 
Santayana does not believe that James could live with truth or certi
 
tude if he found it.
 
Philosophy for him had a Polish constitution; so
 
long as a single vote was cast against the majority,
 
nothing could pass. The suspense of judgment which he
 
had imposed upon himself as a duty, became almost a
 
necessity, f think it would have depressed him if he .
 
had had to cOhfess that any important question was finally
 
settled.... Experience seems to most of us to lead to 29
 
conclusions, but empiricism has sworn never to draw them.
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Rather, Santayana thinks that James drew his false conclu
 
sions from a true psychological fact; the fact that will and belief
 
do influence one's actions.
 
We do not need a will to belieye; we need only a
 
will to study the objects in which we are inevitably

believing. But James was thinking less Of belief in
 
what we find than of belief in what we hope for: a
 
belief which is not at all clear and not jat all neces
 
sary in the life of mortals. I
 
Santayana not only agrees that beliefs, will, and desire do
 
influence actions; he takes Clifford's positijon in the extreme,
 
saying: "...indeed, I think we can go farther and say that in its
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essence belief is an expression of impulse, o|f readiness to act."
 
Like the pragmatists, he finds that human beljefs and impulses become
 
adjusted to the facts of reality through actiions. Again the differ
 
ence between James and Santayana lies in Sant|ayana's commitment to the
 
brute knowable objectivity of the physical world. For this reason,
 
Santayana claims that James is at his worst when he claims that faith
 
in success can be what is needed to bring about a successful conclusion.
 
Here again psychological observationi is used with ­
the best intentions to hearten oneself and other people;
 
but the fact observed is not at all understood, and a
 
moral twist is given to it which (besides: being morally
 
questionable) almost amounts to falsifying the fact it- .
 
self. Why does belief that you can jump a ditch help you
 
to jump it? Because it is a symptom of the fact that you
 
could jump it.;... Assurance is contemptible and fa||l
 
unless it is self-knowledge. (Emphasis Santayana).
 
He invoked Socrates to say that courage without wisdom is folly. Yet
 
he is closer to James's position than Clifford's in holding that 
■ ■ 33 ' 
"Scepticism is...a form of belief. Dogma cannot be abandoned...."
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However, he qualifies this by saying, "The brute necessity of believing
 
something so long as life lasts does not justify any belief in partic
 
ular,...
 
When writing about Bertrand Russell in Winds of Doctrine,
 
Santayana devotes twelve pages to Russell's criticism of pragmatism.
 
Sahtayana both paraphrases Russell and quotes him at length on this
 
subject, with little regard for Russell's own philosophy. Perhaps he
 
chose to use Russell as a vehicle of criticism so as not to cast
 
doubt on his own motives. Russel1 is excellent for this purpose be
 
cause he took the same sort of delight as Santayana did in attempting
 
to make pragmatism look absurd. Sometimes Santayana would step in to
 
help him; for instance when Russell was explaining how the pragmatists
 
paid inadequate attention to the facts, Santayana added:
 
For we should presently learn that those facts can
 
be made by thinking, that our faith in them may contri
 
bute to their reality, and may modify their nature; in
 
other words, these facts are our immediate apprehensions
 
of facts.... Thus the pragmatiSt's reliance on facts
 
does not carry him beyond the psychic sphere; his facts
 
are only his personal experiences. Personal experiences
 
• 	 may well be the basis for no less personal myths; but
 
the effort of intelligence and of science is to find the
 
basis of the personal experiences themselves; and this
 
non-psychic basis of experience is what common sense calls
 
the facts, and what practice is concerned with...the bed
 
rock of facts ifeat the pragmatist bui1ds upon is avowedly
 
drifting sand. ,
 
Through the selective use of Russell's criticisms and his own remarks
 
Santayana paves the way to suggest that the "psychological point of
 
view" of pragmatism,"might be the equivalent to the idealistic doc­
trine.^^ Thus accusing James of being a secret idealist was the ul
 
timate that Santayana could do in discrediting him. He also used an
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historical appraoeh to achieve the same result as he achieved through
 
quoting Russell's analysis:
 
Such economical faith, enabling one to dissolve the
 
hard materialistic world into a work of mind, which mind
 
might outflank, was traditional in the rad^^al Emerson
 
ian circles In which pragmatism sprang up.
 
...they have declared that consciousness does not
 
exist, and that objects of sensation (which at first viere
 
called feelings, experiences, or 'truths') know or mean
 
one another when they lead to one another, when they are
 
poles, so to speak, in the same vital circuit. The
 
spiritual act ■ which was supposed to take things for its
 
object is to be turned Into 'objectlve^pirit,' that Is,
 
Into dynamic relations betweeh things.
 
It certainly was not James's early materialism that bothered
 
Santayana but, rather, his pervasive nominalism.
 
In William James...psychology was the high court of
 
appeal. Ultimately he wrote his Varieties of Religious
 
Experience--by far his most influential book-^in which he
 
showed his strong inclination to credit supernormal in
 
fluences and the immortality of the soul.
 
All this, however, was a somewhat troubled hope which
 
he tested by all available evidence; and his most trusted
 
authorities were often French, Renouvier and later
 
Bergson.... It was only later that he produced the sen
 
sational theories by which he is known, at least by hearsay,
 
all the world over: his Pragmatism, In which the reality
 
of truth seemed to be denied, and his article entitled
 
'Does Consciousness Exist?' where he answered this ques
 
tion In the negative.
 
He consTdered James to be a philosophical coward, one who could not
 
bear the consequences of his underlying materialism. Santayana says,
 
"I cannot understand what satisfaction a philosopher can find in arti
 
fices, or in deceiving himself and others. I therefore like to call
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myself a materialiSt.i.."
 
Indeed, Santayana claimed to be a thorough-going materialist.
 
Matter is primary, the only "stuff" which is real in the nature of
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being'. -.He;says^it
 
I am not tempted seriously to regard consciousness
 
as the very essence of life or even of being. On the
 
contrary, ...Consciousness is the most highly conditioned
 
of existences, ...nor does its orig|^ seem more mysterious
 
to me than that of everything else.
 
Santayana, at the opposite extreme f>"om idealism, very clearly reduces
 
mind to an epiphenomenon of matter.
 
...while the designation of substance as mind-stuff
 
is correct, ii; is by no means exclusively or even pre
 
eminently proper. ...In so far as mind has stuff at all
 
under it and;is not purely spiritual, the stuff of it is
 
purely^matter.
 
...Moreover, organization requires a medium as well
 
as a stuff; and that medium in which the mind-stuff moves
 
is avowedly space and time. But what can exist in space
 
except matter...? Mind-stuff is therefore simply an in
 
direct name for matter...and nothing but a confusing
 
attachment to a psychological vocabulary could consul
 
for its frequent use.
 
I find, then, that in the psychological sphere, apart
 
from pure feeling Or intuition, everything is physical.
 
There is no such thing as mental subst|gce, mental force,
 
mental machinery, or mentaT causation.
 
Santayana considered James to be at his best in the passage in his
 
Psychology where he declares that one is sorry because he cries, angry
 
because he strikes and afraid because he trembles. After giving a
 
vivid account of the human passions run wild in love and anxiety, he
 
explains it in a manner reminiscent of the way James explained the
 
same phenomena by reference to the "machinery" of a chicken:
 
All this is the psyche's work; ...and our super
 
ficial mind is carried by it like a child, cooing and
 
fretting, in his mother's arms. Much of it we feel
 
going on unmistakably within our bodies, and the whole of
 
it in fact goes on there. ...The psyche is an object of
 
experience to herself, since what she does at one moment
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or in one orgari she can observe, perhaps a morrient later,
 
or with another organ; yet of her life as a whole she is
 
aware only as we are aware of the engines and the fur
 
naces in a ship in which we are traveling, half-asleep,
 
or chattering on deck; or as we are aware of a foreign
 
language for the first time...without distinguishing the
 
words, or the reasons for these precise passionate out
 
bursts. In this way we all endure, without understanding,

the existence and the movement of our own psyche: fo^^it
 
is the body that speaks, and the spirit that listens.
 
Unlike James, Santayana saw the necessity of positing an uncoriscious
 
psyche, a natural program for maintaining the life of the body. Of
 
the psyche he says, "...to keep us alive is her first and essential
 
function. It follows naturally from this biological office that in
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each of us she [the psyche] is one, vigilant, and predetermined.,.."
 
It has that same essential function in both plants and animals.
 
He says:
 
The whole life of the psyche, even if hidden by chance
 
from human observation, is essentially observable: it is
 
the object of biology. Such is the only scientific psy
 
chology, as conceived by the ancients, including Ar||totle,
 
and now renewed in behaviorism and psycho-analysis.
 
One might speculate that if JameS had been a philosophical
 
realist like Peirce, then Santayana might have called himself a prag­
matist--albeit grudgingly and with many qualifications. This is
 
because of Santayana's insistence upon the practical knowability of
 
an objective world, and of the efficacy of reason which, as a tool,
 
allows men to live in harmony with nature.
 
Reminiscent of pragmatic learning theory, Santayana says that,
 
"The guide in early sensuous education is the same that conducts the
 
whole Life of Reason, namely, impulse checked by experiment, and ex­
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periment judged again by impulse." He says that.
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...perception and knowledge are...normally and vir
 
tually true: not true literally, as the fond spirit
 
imagines-when it takes some given picture...for the
 
essence of the world; but pragmatically, and for the
 
range of human experience....
 
Thus also, there is nothing to prevent consciousness--spTrit--from
 
having knowledge of its source. Santayana says.
 
In other words, consciousness is naturany cognitive.
 
Its spiritual essence renders it an imponderable subli
 
mation of organic life, and invisible there; yet it is
 
attached historicallyj morally, ag^ indirectly;to its
 
source, by being knowledge of it.
 
It may be said that James's two major contemporary American
 
critics held complementary notions of the nature of consciousness. For
 
Royce, the act of defining one's separate conscious self as over against
 
the rest of consciousness creates something which functions as "matter."
 
Santayana, on the other hand, is acutely aware of the fact that "all
 
matter is alive," ready to actualize its potentials under the right
 
conditions of motion and complexity.
 
Royce and Santayana both agree that the self can know itself and,
 
thus, live in an objectiye harmony with its surroundings; whereas for
 
James there is no such universal objectivity, and it might profit the
 
organism simply to experiment with its life-style. It is this lack of
 
knowledge and commitment which made pragmatism radically different from
 
other world views.
 
;'XHAPTER:3';.. .
 
PRAGMATISM AND THE PROGRESSIV
 
Many researchers of the Progressive Movement in the United States
 
assume that there 'is a connection between pragmatism and progressivism.
 
Yet few are willing to make the connection explicit, other than ac
 
knowledging that they were contemporaneous. For instance, A. S. Link
 
and W. M. Leary have compiled an extensive bibliography. The Progres
 
sive Era and the Great War, 1896-1920,^ without a single mentidn of
 
either pragmatism or William James. Their only mention of John Dewey
 
is Sidney Hook's 1:935 biography. In The Pragmatic Revolt in American
 
History, Gushing Strput said such things as pragmatism "stimulated"2
 
both Charles Beard and Carl Becker; that Beard defended his under­
takings in"characteristieally pragmatic tones," and that Beard and
 
Becker would have agreed with Dewey's factual-contextuaT relativism
 
if they had read such works as his new logic. Strput uses the term
 
"pragmatic" in his title in a technical way, one which he explicitly
 
defines as a form of relativism.^ Then, of course, he equivocates it
 
with the common usage of the term in his work. Although Strout's
 
Pragmatic Revolt is otherwise a good work, his treatment of the connec
 
tion between pragmatism and the historians of the Progressive movement
 
may be taiken as typical: the family resemblance is taken for granted,
 
influences are hinted at, but little is made explicit and no causal re
 
lationships are established.
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Both the pragmatists and the progressive historians shared an
 
explanation of history. However, the best attempts to show the connec
 
tion between the pragmatists and the progressives has come from those
 
who do not share their view of history. George Novack and David Noble
 
are among the best examples of this group.
 
George Novack is a Marxist philosopher and historian who,
 
when discussed among other Marxists, 1s Tabled a "Trotskyite." In 1937
 
he joinedwith Dewey in forming and carrying out The International
 
Commission of Inquiry into the Moscow Trials for the purpose of clearing
 
Trotsky's name. It was Leon Trotsky himself who suggested that Novack
 
research and write a Marxist critique of Dewey's philosophy. In 1975
 
he published Pragmatism Versus Marxism: An Appraisal of John Dewey's
 
Philosophy, the second chapter of which is titled, "Dewey and the Progres
 
sive Movement."
 
Novack sees the Populist-Progressive movement as one fifty year
 
phenomenon; the reaction of a squeezed middle class which was seeking to
 
maintain its position, a "loyal opposition" life wing of the capitalist
 
regime. Novack says:
 
The fundamental reason for the failure of Progres­
sivism lay in the fact that it was truly progressive only
 
in its incidental features. At bottom it was a retrograde
 
movement which aspired to turn back the wheel gf history
 
and reverse the development of modern society.
 
Dewey belongs wholly to this movement. He was a fore
 
most participant in many of its most important enterprises.
 
In time he became the supreme and unchallenged theoretical
 
head of the movement. Dewey was not a leader of its plebian
 
legions like Weaver or La Follette. He was rather the
 
leader of the advanced intellectuals, those who worked out
 
the theoretical premises and formulated the views and
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values corresponding to the mass govement in their various
 
spheres of professionaT activity.
 
In Novack's work Dewey and his pragmatism assume the position
 
of highest intellectual importance. Novack tacitly accepts the position
 
that the "defection of the intellectuals" (not his term) precedes a
 
revolution and hplds the Marxist position that it will be led by those
 
who have been squeezed down from high positions in the capitalist power
 
struggle. Thus pragmatism, the. American philosophy, was (and still is
 
for Novack) a conservative force, bent upon uphoTding the crumbling
 
system through reforms. A nation's philosophy is its ultimate, dis
 
tilled consciousness; hence, Novack alternately sees pragmatism as
 
the tragedy of the middle class or as the instrument of class repres
 
sion wielded by the upper class.
 
Novack fai1s to take account of Dewey's own periods as a socialist,
 
his spirited defense of Trotsky and his view of the class nature of
 
society. On this Dewey says, "The direct impact of 1iberty always has
 
to do with some class or group that is suffering in a social way from
 
some form of constraint ekercised by the distribution of powers that
 
exist in contemporary society."
 
Dewey was also noted for such statements as:
 
The liberals of more than a century ago were de
 
nounced in their time as subversive radicals, and only
 
when the new economic order was established did they be
 
come apologists for the status quo or else content with
 
social patchwork. If radicalism is defined as percep
 
tion of need for radical change, then any liberalism g
 
which is not also radicalism is irrelevant and doomed.
 
Throughout the Thirties Dewey repeatedly called for the abolition of
 
monopoly capitalism and the substitution of a planned economy in its
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placey Perhaps what Novack cannot forgive is that pragmatism, as per
 
sonified in Dewey, does not hold Marxism as the ultimate philosophical
 
truth, but as an option to be considered and evaluated in practice.
 
During the Populist and Progressive eras there was an influ
 
ential trend, in Utopian literature, such as Edward Bellamy's Looking
 
Backward (1888), These works preceded the popularity of Marxism, and
 
conveyed the same message in simpler lahguage. The message was that
 
society is perfectable if only it were governed rationally. It was
 
antithetical to both the profit motive in business and Spencerian social
 
Darwinism as a general philosophy of progress. Significantly, one of
 
the major elements stressed by the Progressive statesmen was economic
 
reform through government action. Like Bellamy, they believed that the
 
government could be a powerful force for human progress, and that "pro
 
gress" was virtually equated with material well being.
 
The Supreme Court was the greatest obstacle to these Progres
 
sive statesmen and they were more successful at 1ocal 1evels. Charles
 
Evans Hughes, a New York lawyer» gained fame for exposing corruption and
 
inefficiency in the insurance companies. In 1906 Hughes was elected
 
governor of New York and continued his reforms through the creation of
 
a state public utilities commission^ However, the preemptive effect
 
of the federal commerce power stunted the working of the commission.
 
Robert M. LaFollette became governor of Wisconsin in 1900 and be
 
came one of the greatest and best known Progressive reformers. A$
 
governor he sponsored many measures designed to promote economic e­
quality: maximum hour laws, workman's compensation, inheritance tax.
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and a graduated income tax. One way or another all of LaFollette's
 
economic reforms ran into trouble with the Supreme Court and suffered
 
compromise, or outright nullification as in the case of the maximum
 
hours measure. In 1906 "Battling Bob" LaFollette was elected to the
 
U. S. Senate where much of his effort was directed against the Supreme
 
Court. One of the major complaints of the Progressives (as well as the
 
Populists before them) was that judicial review was basically undemo
 
cratic. It forced the entire nation to abide by the views of a few
 
old men; men who were never elected in the first place, who could not
 
be removed, and who themselves might be in fundamental disagreement
 
over any basic question (as in the case of narrow split decisions).
 
Ultimately, they felt that the check and balance system had not pro
 
vided a check upon the judiciary.
 
Holmes's Lochner dissent fit perfectly into the Progressive
 
scheme. In Lochner vs. New York (1905--198 U.S. 45) a five to four
 
decision of the U. S. Supreme Court held unconstitutional a New York
 
law limiting bake shop hours to a maximum of ten hours a day. Holmes
 
said:
 
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a
 
large part of the country does not entertain. If it were
 
a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should
 
desire to study it further and long before making up my
 
mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I
 
strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has
 
nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their
 
opinions in law. It is settled by various opinions of
 
this court that state constitutions and state laws may
 
regulate life in many ways which we as legislators might
 
think as injudicious, or if you like, as tyrannical, as
 
this, and which equally with this, interfere with the
 
liberty to contract. ...The 14th Amendment does not
 
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics...a Constitution
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is not intehded to embody a particular theoryv whether of
 
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the
 
state or of laissez-faire. It is made for people of funda­
mentally differing views, and the accident of our finding

certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel and even
 
shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the
 
question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the
 
Constitution of the United States.
 
Three years later, in Muller vs. Oregon (1908: 208 U.S. 412),
 
Louis D. Brandeis defended a similar statute before-the U. S. Supreme
 
Court. This time the dispute was over the constitutionality of an
 
Oregon law prohibiting women in certain industries from working more
 
than ten hours a day. In ah abrupt turnabdut the Court unahimously
 
upheld the Oregon statute. Brandeis' approach was designed to mini
 
mize legal procederits and to stress the results of ruling one way or
 
the other. He had no other choice, since the major precedent, the
 
Lochner case, was against him. So, in reality, his brief consisted of
 
a sociological tract, and the "Brandeis brief" was to set a precedent
 
for future appeals. In 1917 in Bunting vs. Oregon (1917: 243 U.S.
 
426) the Court in effect overturned the Lochner opinion by allowing
 
the state of Oregon to apply the ten hour law to men.
 
Eight years before his Lochner dissent Holmes revealed his
 
basis for it in his"bad man" or predictive theory of law. He said,
 
"If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as
 
a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such
 
knowledge enables him to predict. "The prophecies of what the
 
court will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean
 
bythelaw."^V
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Morality (and natural rights) are not to be confused with
 
Taw for Holmes, as evidenced by the fact that there are bad Taws.
 
"Manifestly, therefore, nothing but confusion of thought can result
 
from assuming that the rights of man in a moral sense are equally
 
rights in the sense of the Constitution and the Taw. ...No one wil1
 
deny that wrong statutes can be and are enforced, and we should not
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al 1 agree as to which were the wrong ones." It is also worth
 
noting that in some cases the statutes are, or will be, disregarded.
 
Here cites an example given by Louis Agassiz where the force of custom
 
was so strong that no enforceable 1aw could be made against it.
 
Holmes believed that moral intent, or the state of mind
 
. ' . "14 ■ 
of a defendant, is not actually a part of a TegaT decision.; Rather, 
it is the objective consequences Of the defendant's actions that are
 
in question. K
 
Holmes says:
 
The primary rights and duties with which juris
 
prudence busies itself again are nothing but prophecies.
 
One of the moral ideas...is that theory is apt to get the
 
cart before the horse, and to consider the right or the
 
duty as something existing apart from and independent of
 
the consequences of its breach, to which certain sanctions
 
are added afterward. But, as I will try to show, a legal
 
duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man
 
does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in
 
this or that-jway by judgment of the court; and so of a
 
legal right.
 
The pragmatic emphasis upon action and results is obvious.
 
In 1933 Morris R. Cohen wrote.
 
It is a curious fact that while critics and re
 
formers of the law formerly used to take their stand on
 
self-evident truths and eternal principles of justice
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and reason, their appeal now is predominantly to vital
 
needs, social welfare, the real or practical need of the
 
times, etc.
 
The seed of the protest against the overemphasis

of the logical element in the law was jDla(ji|ed by Jhering
 
and Justice fiolmes over a generation ago.
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Cohen calls Hoimes's view of the 1aw as;"an anthropological document
 
and says that it could be attached to any modern "ism" such as function
 
alsim or behaviorism. He says, "Hoimes's position is, I judge,; in per
 
fect agreement with that of a logical pragmatist like Peirce; Legal
 
principles have no meaning apart from the judicial decisions in con
 
crete cases that can be deduced from them, and principles alone (i.e.,
 
without knowledge or assumption as to the facts) cannot logically
 
decide cases. He could have made a better comparison of Hoimes's
 
theory to James's epiphenomenalism or spectator theory of motivation.
 
There are other historians, such as Richard Hofstader, who
 
agree that the progressives were orderly reformers, not revolution
 
aries. Reformers work within the given system^ Hofstader says:
 
The Progressive movement, then, may be looked upon
 
as an attempt to develop the moral will, the intellectual
 
insight, and the political and administrative agencies to
 
remedy the accumulated evils and negligences of a period
 
of industriai growth. Since the Progressives were not re­
volutionarieSi it was also aaQattempt to work put a
 
strategy for orderly change.
 
Hofstader's appraisal Of the origin of the Progressiye movement is
 
similar to Novack's, but that in no way leads him to the same conclu
 
sions. One must believe that the basic system itself must be changed
 
drastically if he is not to agree with reform.
 
George Mowry confronts the Marxist historians directly,
 
saying, "The bald confident assertion of the New Left historians
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that big business shaped the Progressive program to its own interests
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seems highly erroneous...." , He goes on to catalogue the struggles
 
that took place between the 'progressives and big business. Regarding
 
the possibility of the overthrow of the whole system, he says:
 
One other question raised by the New Left historians
 
remains—that revolving around their wistful, might-have­
been statement that Progressive reforms drew off the necessary
 
popular support for and therefore obstructed the growth of
 
a viable democratic socialist party. To me, at least, that
 
seems tppbe one of the more impossible fantasies of American
 
history.
 
The institutions of private property are too strong and ingrained, and
 
the Great Depression and two world wars have not been cataclysmic to
 
do what the progressives were supposed to have only set back. It
 
is apparent that the doctrinaire Marxists are wrong.
 
Another contemporary historian who sees a strong tie be
 
tween the Progressive movement and pragmatism is David Noble. He
 
says, "It is my thesis that the point of view of the modern American
 
historian is directly related to the world view of the English Puri­
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tans who came to Massachusetts." This is the notion that the people
 
made a pact with God to remain simple and, thus, virtuous. This is a
 
sort of natural harmony which, as long as it is preserved from arti
 
ficial "alien complexities," will keep America safe from the sort of
 
strife experienced by the rest of the world, especially Europe. The
 
major historians of each generation are, thus, philosopher-prophets,
 
"Jeremiahs," crying out warnings. Since all history was that of arti
 
ficial institutions, not of humanity itself which changes not at all,
 
these historians could be termed as being "against history."
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Noble says that in a 1913 essay of Car^ BeGker's, "Some
 
Aspects of the Influence of Social Problems and Ideas upon the Study
 
and Writing of History Becker mentions Dewey and pragmatism by
 
name as a justification for the historian to select what he considers
 
to be the important facts from the almost limitless chaos of facts.
 
Unlike Novack, Noble views the progressives as using the pragmatists,
 
rather than being led by them. This is very similar to Strout's
 
"skeptical relativism" (another technical term) which he uses to
 
describe Beckeri. Strout says:
 
Becker's answer to the problem ofvSynthesis led
 
him to the skeptical relativism that has made him such
 
a controversial figure. He urged the historian to
 
accept for his own field the implications of pragma-,
 
tism, which made truth and reality subject to change.
 
Did not pragmatism, he asked, undercut the Olympian ideal
 
of objectivity...? It was necessary, he felt, toanalyze
 
the process of historical reconstruction in the light of
 
this new outlook.
 
Strout goes as far as saying that Becker substituted will for objec
 
tivity. He says,"If thought and will are identified, the pursuit
 
of truth is" debased by practical aims, and action deprived of the
 
necessary guidance of knowledge. In giving such dangerous primacy
 
to the practical will, Becker was even more pragmatic than pragma
 
tism itself. •
 
At this point it is worth reviewing what Dewey had to say
 
regarding this twenty-five^years later in 1938.
 
The formation of historical judgments lags behind
 
that of physical judgments not only because of greater
 
complexity and scantiness of the data, but also because
 
to a large extent historians have not developed the
 
habit of stating to themselves and to the public the
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systematic conceptual structures which they employ in or
 
ganizing their data to anything like the extent in which
 
physical inquirers expose their conceptual framework....
 
The slightest reflection shows that the conceptual
 
material employed in writing history is that of the period
 
in v/hich a history is written. There is no material avail
 
able for leading principles and hypotheses save the his
 
toric present. As culture changes, the conceptions that
 
are dominant in a culture change. Of necessity new stand
 
points for viewing, appraising and ordering data arise.
 
History is then rewritten.
 
Recpgnition of change in social states and insti
 
tutions is a precondition of the existence of historical
 
judgment....Annals are material for history but are hardly
 
history itself. Since the idea of history involves cumu
 
lative:continuity of movement in a given direction toward
 
stated outcomes, the fundamental conception that controls
 
determination of subject-matter as historical is that of 2.I
 
a direction of movement. History cannot be written en maSs.
 
All historical construction is necessarily selective.
 
...Furthermore, if the fact of selection is acknowledged to
 
be primary and basic, we are committed to the conclusion
 
that all history is necessarily written from the standpoint

of the present, and is, in an inescapable sense, the history
 
not only of the present but of that which is contempora|s
 
eously judged to be important in it. (Emphasis Dewey).
 
He goes on to give as an example how Herodotus wrote selectively what
 
the Athenians wanted to hear. Dewey claims that historiographers must
 
posit a principle and, in so dojngi "The selection is truly a logical
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postulate as those recognized as such in mathematical propositions." 
■He-saysi ■ 
The notion that historical inquiry simply reinstates 
the events that once happened "as they actually happened"
is incredibly naive. ...For historical inquiry is an 
affair (1) bf selection and arrangement, and (2) is con 
trolled by the dominant problems and conceg^ions of the cul 
ture of the period in which it is written. 
It would seem that during the quarter century since Becker cited prama­
tism Dewey found time to learn from Becker. The instrumental use of 
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history was just what Dewey, Becker and Beard had in mind. Dewey said: 
"A further important principle is that the writing of history is it 
self an historical event. ...The acute nationalism of the present era, 
■ 31 ■ 
for example, cannot be accounted for without historical writing."
 
He continues to say that Marxist history has significantly influenced
 
history in the present also. Dewey said that, "Intelligent under
 
standing of past history is to some extent a lever for moving the
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present into a certain kind of future." He said:
 
History cannot escape its own process. It will,
 
therefore, aIv/ays be rewritten. As the new present-arises,
 
the past is the past of a different present. Judgment in
 
which emphasis falls upon the historic or temporal phase
 
of redetermination of unsettled situations is thus a cul
 
minating evidence that judgment is not a bare enunciation
 
of what already exists but is itself an existential requal­
ification.
 
Thus, for Dewey, Becker was not substituting will for either
 
logic or objectivity. For Dewey, the will is always an essential prin
 
ciple of any logical situation.. Without going into a discussion of
 
their truth or falsity, it can be seen that the relationship between
 
the pragmatists and the progressives Was a two-way affair. In this case
 
William James had proposed a theory of perception and action, John Dewey
 
had expanded it, Carl Becker ahd acted upon it and Dewey had come back
 
to his rescue.
 
The "family resemblance,"the contemporaneousness and the
 
sharing of methods leads one to suspect that there was something basic
 
shared by both pragraatism and the Progressive movement.
 
One of the most obvious characteristics shared by both prag
 
matism and progressivism is the notion of evolutionary progress. James
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Harvey Robinson (1863-1935) had done advanced work in biology at Harvard
 
and had studied under WiTliam James. He approached psychology from the
 
standpoint of evolutionary biology as James did. Dorothy Ross said, "Among
 
all the social sciences, it was psychology that suggested to Robinson the
 
central question the historian should ask: 'the great and fundaraental
 
question of how mankind learns and disseminates his discoveries and mis­
.34 ■ 
apprehensions... " Robinson accepted the idea that the brain—and
 
thought--was an instrument of adaptation.
 
However, evolution was more than just adaptive, it was pro-^
 
gressive. Robinson added "faith'' to evolution:
 
i..I, for one, have faith that if we gave it a
 
show, mere human intelligence, based upon our ever in
 
creasing knowledge, would tend to remedy or greatly allev
 
iate many forms of human discontent and misery. This is
 
a matter of faith, I admit. But holding this faith, the
 
chief end of education seems to me to be ^be encourage
 
ment of a scientific attitude of mind....
 
His age had witnessed such amazing breakthroughs in technoiogy as to
 
make his generation noticably different from the preceding one. Per
 
haps this can throw light oh his extravagant appraisal of science:
 
"Science, in short, includes all the careful and critical knowledge we
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have about anything of which we can come to know something about."
 
(Emphasis Robinson). Robinson sought to make history into a science,
 
thus actually helping in the progress of He accepted the later
 
pragmatists' instrumental explanation of mind. The task was now to find
 
out what laws governed between man and nature that ensured causal
 
patterns of adaptation. Then man might control his history as he did
 
his physical environment. He said:
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Hitherto writers have been prone to deal with
 
events for their own sake; a deeper insight will surely
 
lead us.l.to reject the anomalous and seemingly accidental
 
occurrences and dwell rather on those which illustrate
 
some profound historical truth. And there is a very

simple principle by which the relevant and useful may be
 
determined and the irrelevant rejected. Is the factor
 
occurrence one which will aid the reader to grasp the
 
meaning of any great period of human development or the
 
true nature of any momentous institution?
 
Robinson says that there have been many sorts of histories, "But the
 
one thing that it ought to do, and has not effectively done, is to help
 
us understand ourselves and our fellows and the problems and prospects
 
of mankind. He calls this the most significant form of history.
 
More important, the present human condition is a result of past history,
 
and does not change as rapidly as it could if it were adequately under
 
stood. The understanding is an instrument for desired change or action.
 
Robinson used the example of an individual's history, which is, respon
 
sible for what he is doing at the present, to suggest that the collec
 
tive consciousness of societies function in the same manner. This con
 
stituted a perfect instance of applying the pragmatic view of mind—the
 
very heart of pragmatism—to history. Reform can only take place when
 
the process that produced the present is understood. He says:
 
We must develop historical-mindedness upon a far
 
more generous scale than hitherto, for this will add a
 
still deficient element in our intellectual equipment
 
and will promote rational progress as nothing else can
 
do. The present has hitherto been the willing victim
 
of the past; the time has now come when it should turn
 
on the past and exploit it in the interests of advance.
 
' The 'New History' is escaping from the limita
 
tions formerly imposed upon the study of the past. It
 
will come in time consciously to meet our daily needs;
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it will come in time to avail itself of all those dis
 
coveries that are being made about mankind by anthro
 
pologists, economists, psychologists and sociologists-­
discoveries which during the past fifty years have served
 
to revolutionize our i^|a of the origin, progress and
 
prospects of our race.
 
Robinson cites Karl Marx as being among the earliest who "...denounced
 
those who discover the birthplace of history in the shifting clouds of
 
heaven instead of in the hard, daily work on earth. Although Robin
 
son denied that Marx's economic theory accounted for everything, he
 
was greatly impressed by the fruits of his new method as well as its
 
origin, and considered it a great advance over all past methods. Like
 
Marx, Robinson saw that the historian should be the one who studies
 
all knowledge as a whole, he advocates becoming the historian-philosopher:
 
"...specialization would lead to the most absurd results if there were
 
not some one to study the process as a whole; and that some one is
 
the historian. In effect, such an historian becomes the only
 
legitimate philosopher, taking a God's-eye-view of the results of all
 
knowledge. The fact is that the specialist, by his nature as a
 
specialist, is unable to trace all the effects and interrelations of
 
his particular discipline.
 
This faith in progress becomes even stronger in Charles Beard.
 
Beard defines progress:
 
Briefly defined, it implies that mankind, by making
 
use of science and investigation, can progressively e­
mancipate itself from plagues, famines, and social disas
 
ters, and subjugate the materials and forces o|2the earth
 
to the purpose of the good life--here and now.
 
In substance, it is a theory that the lot of man­
' kind on this earth can be continually improved by the
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attainment of exact knowledge and the subjugation of
 
the material world to the reqgirements of human wel
 
fare. Assoeiated with it are many subsidiary concepts.
 
Its controning interest is in this earth, in our own
 
time, not in a remote heaven to be attained after death.
 
It assumes an indefinite future and plans for greater
 
security, health, comfort, and beauty in the coming
 
years. While a phi^QSophy of history, it is also a
 
gospel of futurism.
 
He goes on to make the Hegelian move of identifying progress with
 
nn ■ ' ., 
rationality itself. This Hegelian strain becomes even more evident 
as he uses art and architecture to i11ustrate the Zeitqeist from 
culture to culture, saying, "All branches of civilization mirror the 
■ 45 ■ ■■ 
dominant idea."
 
"Hegelianism" was alive and well then as it is today. David
 
Noble makes the remark that, "Our final vision of the frontier is that
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which came from the Europe of Rousseau and Hegel." From Rousseau
 
came the connection of virtue with naturalism and simplicity, and from
 
Hegel came the notion of an unfolding national destiny. If Noble had
 
followed up this last notion he might have gained a great deal.
 
Dewey was a philosophical idealist for a good part of his
 
life before he converted, through James, to pragmatism. His idealism
 
may be termed "Hegelian" in that it was progressive, and it was not
 
held in order to contemplate a realm of perfect eternal forms. In the
 
1890's he was busy defining such things as the will as "the self
 
realizing itself." When he converted to pragmatism he toOk much of
 
his former psychology with him. Today's "progressive" education's pre
 
occupation with "growth" and"self-realization" is in large part
 
traceable to Dewey's years as a"Hegelian."
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the most famous "Hegelian" in the history of thought
 
is Karl Marx. When Marx stood Hegel on his head he merely substituted
 
History or Matter in motion fdr God. The dialectical interpenetration
 
of opposites, by itself, is no less mysterious without God, Spirit or
 
Reason. After making consciousness an effect of matter in motion,
 
Marx began to search for historical Taws, or regularities to explain
 
the progressive movement of history. Of course, the best known of
 
these is his dialectual materiaTism. The key to Marxist psychology
 
is Marx's statement that, "it is not the consciousness of men that de
 
termines their existence, but their social existence that determines
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their consciousness." Man is matter become conscious and, up until
 
Marx, that consciousness was merely an epiphenomenal reflection of that
 
matter. Now that Marx had discovered man's true history he could be
 
come "self-knowing" for the first time. For the Marxists only the econ
 
omist-philosopher and the historian-philosopher can adequately perceive
 
the human estate.
 
For the pragmatiSt the true human state is perceived by the
 
psychologist-philosopher and the historian-philosopher. The conception
 
of mind is basically the same for both the pragmatist and the Marxist.
 
The basic difference is that whereas Marxism tends to be a form of Con
 
tinental rationalism in practicej pragmatism takes its lead from
 
Brittish empiricism: for the fiarxist reality must conform to his iron
 
laws; whereas for the pragmatist his laws must conform to reality, they
 
must "work" in practice. The Hegelian factor in both systems is that
 
they are "progressive." Evolution is not just change and adaptation.
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it is progress. It goes from the lower to the higher, to the more con
 
scious and rational. This Hegelian faith in progress was common to the
 
vast majority of the reformers of the Progressive Era.
 
What evidence there is shows that socio-economic determinism
 
in America developed independently of Marx. Stow Persons says:
 
The materialist interpretation of history, a
 
preoccupation with the economic basis of the class
 
struggle, and the sense that society formed an
 
interacting organic whole were naturalistic ideas
 
independent olgthe particular formulation that Marx
 
gave to them.
 
The evolutionary anthropologists, who were
 
historians in the broadest sense, were among the first
 
to indicate the possibiligies of a comprehensive in
 
terpretation of history.
 
Lewis Henry Morgan is the perfect example here. His independent "dis
 
covery" of natural, progressive stages of economic evolution was often
 
cited by Marx and Engels. The fact of his independent discovery gave
 
Marx proof that the data was scientific and objective. Beard is
 
another good example. Persons says.
 
As early as 1916, Charles Beard had listed the
 
names of those whom he regarded as mentors in the tra
 
dition of economic interpretation of politics: Aris
 
totle, Machiavelli, Harrington, Locke, Madison, Webster
 
and Calhoun. Marx's name was conspicuous by its absence,
 
and many years later, when someone questioned him on the
 
point. Beard readily conceded that Marx was, like himself,
 
a collateral descendant of these same teachers. The omission
 
of Marx had not been an oversight. The bond that united
 
Simons and the Beards was not a common dependence on Marxism;
 
it was a commop-,participation in the basic presuppositions
 
of naturalism.
 
W. A. Winiams makes the point that, "Beard never attacked private pro
 
perty as such, not even in the heyday of the Progressive movement or the
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New Deal." Williams continues:
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Those who caTT Beard a Marxian would seem to make
 
the fundamental error of equating economic determinism
 
with Marxism. Economic determinism is an open-ended
 
system of causal analysis. Marxism, as generally under
 
stood and as used by the critics of Beard, is a closed
 
system of Utopian prophecy. Beard tried to clarify the
 
difference between these two systems by pointing out that
 
the ancients, from Aristotle to James Harrington, had em
 
phasized economicg^ifferences as a source of dynamic con
 
flict and change.
 
In conclusion, Williams quotes Lenin's statement that, "A Marxist is one
 
who extends the acceptance of class struggle to the dictatorship of the
 
proletariate, (Emphasis Williams), and then reminds the reader that
 
Beard never did so. This is why it was natural for Beard to look to
 
Madison rather than Marx.
 
What produced the faimly resemblance among historians, sociol
 
ogists, economists, anthropologists, educators and philosophers of the
 
Progressive Era--the New Academia—now can be made explicit. It was
 
the materialist-functionalist view of the human mind based on the theory
 
of evolution, combined with a disguised Hegelian theory of progress.
 
The philosophy of man—what it is to be human—is primarily a theory of
 
mind. Virtually all the new social sciences and philosophy had con
 
verted from the view of mind as a changeless spirit which was capable
 
of intuiting eternal truths, to one of mind as a tool of adaptation,
 
itself still changing and in the making. The Hegelian idea of inevitable
 
progress had lost its zig-zag dialectical quality in favor of lineal
 
"stages" of development. Terms such as "manifest destiny" and "stages
 
of self-actualization" are testimony to the American materialist adapta
 
tion of Hegelianism. The Chicago pragmatists, Dewey, C. I. Lewis and
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George H. Mead, are distinguished by the fact that they worked longest
 
and hardest on coinpleting the theoretical aspects, the philosophy, of
 
this view of man and nature. As Darnell Rucker puts it, "If psychology
 
Was initially subordinated to philosophy departmentally at Chicago, the
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tail may have been said to have wagged the dog." T. A. Goudge agrees
 
and adds, "The pragmatists were the first group of philosophers to work
 
out in detail a philosophy of mind based on evolutionary principles.
 
Moreover, since they were familiar with classical ideas in the field,
 
they were able to access the kinds of changes in those ideas which
 
evolutionary principles required.
 
CHAPTER 4
 
THE CHICAGO PRAGMATISTS:
 
GEORGE HERBERT AND CLARENCE IRVING LEWIS
 
For all intents and purposes, World War I brought an end to
 
the Progressive movement in the United States. For a short time almost
 
the whole world was in philosophic retreat. Paul Weiss credits the war
 
for leading to the final disillusionment with high-minded speculation
 
and ultimate truths, and for the subsequent popularity of Logical
 
Positivism. Of the latter he says:
 
This doctrine alone seemed to answer adequately to
 
that far-flung post-war spirit of disillusionment which
 
so readily gave up the belief in fixed ideals and stan
 
dards and the possibility of knowledge reaching beyond
 
the here and now. 'The Lost Generation' thought it better
 
to strain for present clarity than for ultimate truth.
 
The pragmatists had moved their center to the University
 
of Chicago in the decade before the war. For the next generation of
 
English speaking professional philosophers everything was dominated by
 
linguistic analysis. Earlier, James had proven that pragmatism lent
 
itself to linguistic analysis by stressing what he had shown terms
 
like the "Absolute" to mean in practice, l^hat was left for the academic
 
pragmatists was to justify the connection between their evolutionary
 
psychology and a "scientific" way of talking about the world.
 
In one respect pragmatism had an advantage. Since it is a
 
philosophy of and for action, it could lay claim to being both scien
 
tific and optimistic. In spite of the fact that both G. H. Mead and
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C. I, Lewis considered Josiah Royce to be their best professor at Harvard
 
they both rejected him in favor of a "scientific" phTlosophy of action.
 
Now their task was to upgrade and defend this philosophy against Royce,
 
Santayana, Russell and others. , Mead and Lewis may be thought of as
 
those who were doing the precision work for John Dewey, leaving him free
 
to do popular works in politics and education.
 
Action is the center around which the entire philosophies
 
of Mead and Lewis revolve. For George Herbert Mead (1863-1931), in
 
telligence is not properly designated as a characteristic of mind
 
■ . 1 
because it is mereTy the adaptation of the organism to its environment.
 
It is found in vegetables and unicelluar forms. Rather, mind is an ex
 
tension of intelligence, the basic ability of an organism to act or
 
adapt for its own good. Mead makes a better example of the inversion
 
of idealism than Charles Beard does. In a preface to one of Mead's
 
works, Dewey says that not only was idealism the dominant philosophy
 
when Mead began his career, but that he considered Mead's entire
 
philosophical development to be an outgrowth of his problem with the
 
nature of individual consciousness. Again, he had to square it with
 
the fact that reality consisted ultimately of physical matter in
 
motion.
 
In reaction to Bergson, Mead said that, "The unit of exis
 
tence is the act, not the moment. And the act stretches from stimulus
 
to response."^ Any act is an adaptation of the organism to its environ­
ment. For Mead,"Thinking is a certain way of solving problems." It
 
arises only when the action is complex enough that direct or habitual
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action is blocked. Like John Watson, Mead implies that the organism
 
is passive in its act of adjustment to the environment:
 
A living organism has only such an environment
 
as it can respond to in so far as it receives stimu
 
lations from it. Its environment, therefore,: is
 
bounded by the capacity of the organism to be affected
 
by it through its various sense processes. Further
 
more, the objects that exist in that environment are g
 
determined by the form of the responses of the organism.
 
He says that, "Consciousness is involved where there is a problem,
 
where one is deliberately adjusting one's self to the world, trying to
 
get out of difficulty or pain."^ Without the possibility of action,
 
thought and sensation are worthless. Mead's solution to the problem of
 
.mind-body dualism is to say that, "...pragmatism regards cognition as
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simply a phase of conduct, denying any awareness to immediate experience."
 
John B. Watson (1878-1958) studied under both Dewey and
 
Mead at Chicago. In his autobiography he states that he learned nothing
 
from either one of them in class, but that he and Mead had a very good
 
reTationship when the latter would visit him in his animal laboratory.
 
Mead and Dewey rejected Watson's Classical behaviorism of the reflex
 
arc because it did not account for conscious intelligence or planning.
 
Also, it was too individualistic. However, both had the highest regard
 
for its "scientific" character of sticking with objective data. Mead
 
said that, "Social differentiation is the function of what we call mental
 
life. and behavioristic psychology is bringing this highest phase of
 
organization among the members of the species within the pale of scien­
9
 
tific contemplation and control." He says that, "The opposition of the
 
behaviorist to introspection is justified. It is not a fruitful under­
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taking from the point of view of psychological study. ...What the behav­
idrist is occupied with, what we have to come back to, is the actual
 
reaction itself. Mead explicitly and simply identifies meaning with
 
response.
 
Mead saw that Watson's animal behaviorism was capable of
 
great extension. He said,"A behavioristic psychology represents a
 
definite tendency rather than a system, a tendency to state as far as
 
possible the conditions under which the experience of the individual
 
arises. Of his own psychology Mead said, "It is behavioristic,
 
but unlike Watsonian behaviorism it recognizes the parts of the act
 
which do not come to external observation, and it emphasizes the act
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of the human individual in its natural situation." In discussing
 
Watson, Mead said that it is impossible to reduce consciousness to
 
behavior, but it is possible to explain it behavioristically. This is
 
Mead's functional approach. He says that, "Mental behavior is not
 
reducible to non-mental behavior. But mental behavior or phenomena can
 
be explained in terms of non-mental behavior or phenomena as arising
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out of, and as resulting from complications in the latter." He wrote:
 
We want to approach language not from the stand
 
point of inner meanings to be expressed, but in its
 
larger context of cooperation in the group taking place
 
by means of signals and gestures. Meaning appears with
 
in that process. Our behaviorism is a social behavior
 
ism.
 
If Mead had stopped at that point he might have been known as
 
the father of modern operant conditioning, and the connection between
 
pragmatism and behaviorism would be explicit. As things are, B. F.
 
Skinner has never mentioned his indebtedness to Mead. Perhaps this is
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because of Mead's 'Freudian" behaviorisrn.
 
Mead was critical of Freud for the Tatter's excessive emphasis
 
on sex, and found little that was good to say about him. However, he
 
accepted the notion that there were general biological reasons behind
 
or governing most specific human actions. Mead says, "The good reasons
 
for which we act and by which we account for our actions are not the
 
real reasons."^® David L. Miller suggests that Mead's "T" and "Me"
 
are best explained in terms of Freud's Id and Superego. Where Mead
 
differs from Freud is that the "I" could never exist without the"Me,"
 
the generalized "other"adapted from Thomas Cooley's looking-glass self.
 
Man,is strictly a social animal at the psychic level, and language is
 
merely a form of learned behavior. The psyche is not a product of
 
biology.
 
Also unlike Freud, internal conflicts between the"I" and
 
the"Me" occur only when the structure of society is inadequate to meet
 
the individual's problems. He does not accept Freud's idea that "free"
 
man is necessarily in conflict with a society which is by nature restric
 
tive. What Mead rejected in Cooley was the idea of starting with selves
 
which, later, took the attitude of others. Independent conscious entities
 
were abhorrent to him.
 
Mead's conception of the human psyche pivots upon language as
 
the means for cooperation in action. He picked up the idea of the ges
 
ture from the physician-psychologist Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) while
 
studying in Germany and modified it to suit his system. For Mead, "The
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language symbol is simply a significant or conscious gesture." The
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fundaraentai characteristic of a significant or conscious gesture is
 
that it affects the speaker in the same way as it affects the one
 
spoken to—i.e., they both respond the same way and, hence, they
 
share a common meaning. Thus he achieves his purpose and can say
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that, "The locus of mind is not in the individual." "Psycholog
 
ically, the perspective of the individual exists in nature, not in
 
the individual. Physical science has recently discovered this and
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enunciated it in the doctrine of relativity." He findSithat re
 
lationships and responses are beginning to take the place of con
 
sciousness in both science and philosophy.
 
Language is the means of building the self or gener
 
alized other. According to Mead:
 
We are, especially through the use of vocal ges
 
tures, continually arousing in ourselves those responses
 
which we call out in other persons, so that we are
 
taking the attitude of the other person into our own
 
conduct. The critical importance of language in the
 
development of human experience lies in the fact that
 
the stimulus is one that can react upon the speaking in
 
dividual as it reacts upon the other.
 
A behaviorist, such as Watson, holds that all ■ 
our thinking is vocalization. In thinking we are 
simply starting to use certain words. That is in a 
sense true.
 
His criticism,of Watson is that Watson does not take into
 
account the full social complexities of language. In short, Watson
 
was a psycho-biologist rather than a socio-psycho-biologist. Vocal
 
stiraulation is also self-stimulation: "That is fundamental for any
 
language; if it is going to be language one has to understand what
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he is saying, has to affect himself as he affects others."
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Only in terms of gestures as significant symbols
 
is the existence of mind or intelligence possible; for
 
only in terms of gestures which are significant sj^bols
 
can thinking--which is simply an internalized or implicit
 
. conversation of the indtvi^^al with himself by means of,
 
such gestures--take place.
 
Thinking is a matter of talking to one's self, only it is a sociaT pro
 
duct in that it is the individual's "I" which carries on a dialogue
 
with his "Me" or social "self", and even the "I" is a social product
 
since it cannot exist without a "Me."
 
Mead writes, "It is necessary to presuppose a system in order to
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define the objects that make up that system." Society provides that
 
system through its language. Mead accepts the consequence that this
 
makes reality and rationality a relative matter. He remarks: "Now
 
relativity...has not only vastly complicated the spatio-temporal theory
 
of measurement, but it has also reversed what I may call the reality
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reference." Mead used Einstein's theory of relativity in physics
 
to argue to a theory of social relativity in consciousness.'26 He
 
notes:
 
Reason is the reference to the relations of things
 
by means of symbols.
 
No individual or form which has not come into the
 
use of such symbols is rational. A system of these
 
symbols/ is what is called language,.... It always in
 
volves, even when language makes thought possible, a
 
cooperative social process. It is society that through
 
the mechanism of cooperative activity has endowed man
 
with reason. It is only through ct)mmunication that
 
meanings have arisen.
 
Language is ultimately a form of behavior and
 
calls for the rationally organized society within which
 
it can function. It implies commonoends, and common
 
ends are ipso facto rational ends.
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Striving for comraon ends—doing and saying what those around one are
 
doing and saying—is being rational for Mead. There is nothing more
 
objective than soGiety to appeal to.
 
At this point it is worth noting that the philologist,
 
Edward Sapir (1884-1939), and his famous student, the linguistic
 
anthropologist, Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897^1941), were contemporaries
 
of Mead at Chicago. Whorf remarked;
 
We cut nature up, organize it into concepts
 
and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we
 
are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way—
 
an agreement that holds throughout our speech community
 
and is codified in the patterns of our language. The
 
agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated one,
 
BUT ITS TERMS ARE ABSOLUTELY OBLIGATORY:.... (Emphasis '
 
Whorf).
 
We are thus introduced to a new principle of
 
relativity, which holds that all observers are not led
 
by the same physical evidence to the same picture of
 
the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are
 
similar, or can in some way be calibrated.
 
This rather startling conclusion is not so apparent
 
if we compare only our modern European languages....
 
But this unanimity exists only because.these tongue|gare
 
all Indo-European dialects cut to the same plan....
 
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis may be taken as the extreme position of
 
linguistic relativity (at least as derived by social scientists). If
 
they Gonsciously owed anything to Mead they did not admit it. However,
 
the important point is that once consciousness is no longer seen as an
 
independent entity, it must become relative to something. If one
 
chose the behavioristic position--either classical or operant--that
 
thought is accounted for by speech, and that speech is learned
 
behavior, then it follows that thought and consciousness is a learned
 
process, relative to the society and language group that teaches it.
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B. F. Skinner wrote, "Without the help of a verbal
 
community all behavior would be unconscious. Consciousness is a social
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product." Michael Polanyi remarked:
 
All human thought comes into existence by grasping
 
the meaning and mastering the use of language. Little
 
of our mind lives in our natural body; a truly human in
 
tellect dwells in us^^nly when our lips shape words and
 
our eyes read print.
 
Our native gift of speech enables us to enter on
 
the mental life of man by assimilating our cultural her
 
itage. We come into existence mentally, by adding to our
 
bodily equipment in articulate framework and using it for
 
understanding experince. Human thought grows only within
 
language and since language can ex^st only in society,
 
all thought is rooted in society.
 
David Miller says that Mead,
 
...would agree with Wittgenstein that there can
 
be no private language, that...the life of a word is in
 
its use, that language is a social affair involving
 
communication, that language Is the vehicle of thought,
 
that thoughts and Ideas are not subjective
 
Parts of The Blue Book, The Brown Book, and the
 
Investigations read as if Wittgenstein had been communi
 
cating with the deceased Mr. Mead but had received only

Mead's concTusionioard not the experimental basis for
 
arriving at them.
 
Whether or not Whorf, Skinner, Polanyi, Or Wittgenstein owe
 
anything directly to Mead, it is obvious that they all arrived at sim
 
ilar conclusions concerning language. They all hold that thought is
 
acquired via speech, that it determines the nature of one's thought
 
and that ultimately it is a learned behavior similar to any other.
 
Mind ultimately is located outside the organism,
 
C. I. Lewis (1883-1964) also stressed action as the basis
 
for knowing. As Lewis states, "The ruling interest In knowledge is
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the practical interest of action." 34 He continues by noting that
 
The significance of conception is for knowledge.
 
The significance of all knowledge is for possible action.
 
And the significance of common conception is for community
 
of action. Congruity of behavior is the ultimate prac­
ticai test of common understanding. Speech is only that
 
part of behavior which is most significant of minings
 
and most useful for securing human cooperation.
 
Like Mead, Lewis finds that the key to the evolution of
 
the human mind is the hand. Man's dexterous hands, his opposable
 
thumbs, were better adapted for rearranging the world than anything
 
any of the other animals possessed. All the senses are an extension
 
of the sense of touch. This is what makes Lewis a pragmatist since
 
touching is used to manipulate the environment. Humans had the for
 
tune of having an adaptive nervous system commensurate with their
 
physical possibilities. Lewis finds the hand-brain situation to be
 
of almost equal importance; he has a preference for viewing evplution
 
as being organic rather than lineal. However, he concludes that the
 
hand must have preceded brain development, since men have yet to
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catch up with their potential for physical manipulation. Thus the
 
unique potential for human action is the genesis of the uniquely com
 
plicated human brain.
 
Also like Mead, Lewis sees that;the common world, or
 
common reality, is a social product created by the needs of cooperative
 
action. He writes:
 
Our common understanding and our common world may
 
be, in part, created in response to our need to act
 
together and to comprehend one another....
 
Indeed, our categories are almost as much a social
 
product as is language, and in much the same sense. It
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is onl.y the possibility of agreement that must be ante­
cedently presumed. The 'human mind' is a coincidence
 
of individual minds which partly, no doubt, must be
 
native, but partly is itseTf create^^ social pro
 
cess. (Emphasis Lewis).
 
He further stated, "Our common world is very 1argely a social achieve­
ment--an achievement in which we triumph over a good deal of diversity
 
in sense experience."38' One understands or anticipates what others
 
are going to. do, what are their wants and habits; and then must coordi­
nate his actions:with theirs, especially with regards to ends. He
 
continues, "The sharing of a common 'reaTity' is, in some part, the
 
aim and the result of social cooperation, not ah initial social datum
 
prerequisite to common knowledge." Thus» to a large extent social
 
action precedes and creates social awareness, as with Marx or Beard.
 
After Lewis concedes that there must be some sort of preexisting common
 
reality in order to entertain common action and common concepts, he
 
.continues:
 
But both our common concepts and our common reality
 
are in part a social achievement, directed by the commun
 
ity of needs and interests and fostered in the interest
 
of cooperation. Even our categories may be, to a degree,
 
such social products; and so far as the dichotomy of sub
 
jective and objective is governed by consideration of
 
conmunity, reality itself reflects criteria which are
 
social in their nature.
 
So far, Lewis sounds in agreement with Mead, Whorf, Skinner
 
and Polanyi. However, this is deceptive because Lewis has a different
 
causal sequence. For Lewis social reality is a matter of cooperative
 
action, and the stress in on physical action, not verbal.
 
For this reason, meaning precedes language. The farthest
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that Lewis ever went in equating thought with language was an aside in
 
■Al" ■ ■ 
which he added, "Also, we largely think in words.. His usual 
position is closer to (early) James' : Lewis says,"Action precedes re 
flection and even precision of behavior commonly outruns precision of 
.,42thought--fortunately for us. For Lewis it is the relationship of 
actions that are meaningful, rather than responses as with Mead. As if 
in response to Mead, Lewis had written: 
Meanings are conveyed by language.... But it would 
be doubtful that meaning arises through communication or 
that verbal formulation is essentials Presumably the 
meanings to be expressed must come before the linguistic
expression of them, .Also other things than language 
have meaning.... 
He goes on to stress that certain fixed meanings are necessary to crea­
tures which survive through their own behavior—regardless of language. 
As if referring to Sapir and Whorf: 
■ • ■ ) , : • ■ . ■ ■ 
The linguistic use of symbols is indeed determined 
by convention and alterable at will. Also what classif­
ications are to be made, and by what criteria, and how 
these classifications shall be represented, are matters , 
of decision. ...Nevertheless such conventionalism would 
put emphasis in the wrong place. Decision as to what 
meanings shall be established, or how those attended 
shall be represented, c an in no wise affect the relat^^ns 
which these meanings themselves have or fail to have. 
Even though it is true that ane's culture determines what aspects of 
reality its members will str ass and be aware of, the relationships of 
these parts are objective and independent of human will. The whole 
system always conforms to rules and, unlike Whorf's formulation, those 
rules are objective. Action and, therefore, meaning takes place in 
the objective world of relations. According to Lewis: 
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The original determinations of analytic truth, and
 
the final court of appeal with respect to it, cannot
 
lie in linguistic usage, because meanings are not the
 
creations df language but are antecedent, and the re
 
lations of meanings are not determined by our syntactic
 
conventions but are determinative of the significance
 
which our syntactic usages may have. Once we have pene
 
trated the circle of independent meanings and made genuine
 
contact with them by our modes of expression, the appeal
 
to linguistic relationships can enormously facilitate
 
and extend our grasp of analytic truth. But the first
 
such determinations and the final test must lie with
 
meanings in that sense in which there would be meanings
 
even if there were no linguistic expression of them, and
 
in which the progress of successful thinking must conform
 
to actual connections of such meanings eveg^if this
 
process of thought should be unformulated.
 
Lewis' conception of mind and consciousness is based in the action and
 
survival of the individual organism, not necessarily society. Society-­
a system of cooperation—is a particular way of surviving, a later
 
modification of the thought process; but the human psyche itself is not
 
a social product. Even though matter at the thing-in-itself stage can
 
be interpreted in many different ways; all of them functional, it is
 
still the first thing to condition consciousness via the body that
 
must survive in it. He noted, "We must express meanings by the use of
 
words; but if meanings altogether should end in words, then words
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altogether would express nothing."
 
Lewis is careful enough to differentiate between the way
 
something is expressed and what is expressed. He was also influenced
 
enough by the Logical Positivists to believe that the verifiability
 
principle was not incompatible with 3 pragmatic philosophy of action.
 
If action and survival were objective, then so is what can be said
 
about action and possible action. According to Lewis:
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The mode of expression of any analytic truths is
 
thus dependent upon linguistic conventions; as is also
 
the manner in which any empirical: fact is to be formulated
 
and conveyed. But the meanings which are conveyed by
 
symbols^ on account of a stipulated or customary usage
 
of them, and the relation of meanings conveyed by an
 
order of symbols, on account of syntactic stipulations or
 
customary syntactic usagOj are matters antecedent to and
 
/	independent of conventions affecting the linguistic
 
manner in which they are conveyed. The manner in which
 
any truth is to be told by means of language, depends
 
on conventional linguistic usage. But the truth or
 
falsity of what is expressed, is independent of any
 
particular linguistic conventions affecting the expres
 
sion of it.\ If the conventions were otherwise, the manner
 
of 	telling it would be different, but what is to be told,
 
and the truth or falsity of it, would remain the same.
 
That is something which n^jTinguistic convention can
 
touch. (Emphasis Lewis) .
 
He 	could be so opposed to Sapir and Whorf because meaning (action)
 
gives rise to objectivity rather than society. Lewis could even use
 
this as a key to look for objective value, whereas Mead says, "There
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is 	no science in a statement of value."
 
In the case of his famous "private language" problem
 
Wittgenstein might have done better to read Lewis rather than Meadr­
and perhaps he did, but no one knows. Simply stated, there is no
 
common object or verifiability when one talks about a "private"
 
sensation or the sensation in itself. A favorite passage of
 
Wittgenstein's, often quoted by modern behaviorists is:
 
The essential thing about private experience is
 
really not that each person possesses his own exemplar,
 
but that nobody knows whether other people have this
 
or something else. The assumption would then be possible—
 
though univerifiable--that one section of mankind had one
 
sensation of re| and another section had another. (Emphasis
 
Wittgenstein).
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Wittgenstein infers that there can be no use in referring to a sensa
 
tion at the level of sens^ion itself; for another example he uses
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the sensation of greenness.
 
Wittgenstein compares private sensations to a beetle in a
 
box, a box which everyone has, and where no one can see into anyone
 
else's box. Whatever is inside of it, if anything, does not really
 
matter to anyone else. He says that, "...one can 'divide through'
 
■ 51by the thing in the box, it cancels out whatever it is." It is
 
CO . . .
 
"irrelevant." He appears to suggest that the sensation itself is
 
not something v/hich one informs others about. No one can give another
 
any information about the qualitative aspects of his mental phenomena,
 
in themselves. Any such description must rest upon what is objective,
 
such as the agreement to call certain kinds of surfaces shades of the
 
color blue; or else rest upon some connection with its natural ex
 
pression, such as pain-behavior. What Wittgenstein has, here, for
 
the information actually communicated is tendentiousness (similar to
 
H. H. Price) in the case of the emotions). Also here he has linguistic
 
agreement, or similarity of usage, in the case of objective qualities,
 
such as the color red. Wittgenstein says that,"You learned the con- .
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cept 'pain' when you learned the language.'! (Emphasis Wittgenstein).
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It is "new pain-behavior."
 
Mead, the social behaviorist, was willing to say, "I see no
 
reason to assume that, if a similar neural access to cerebral tracts
 
were possible, we might not share with others identical memory-imagery."
 
Miller's interpretation that Mead would agree with Wittgenstein on the
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impossibility of private language is inaccurate since they were talking
 
about essentially different things. For Mead there could be no pri
 
vate language simply because language requires another person to com
 
municate with and to create language or consciousness. For Wittgenstein
 
the notion of "private language" refers to the object of communication.
 
When Mead does refer to direct experience he either takes it mechanis
 
tically, as above, or openly states that he knows them to be different
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fromSindividual to individual./ Thus he lacks the subtility of Lewis
 
and Wittgenstein.
 
Lewis wrote:
 
It is one essential feature of what the word 'mind'
 
means that minds are private; that one's own mind is
 
something with which one is directly acquainted—nothing
 
more so--but that the mind of another is something which
 
one is unable directly to inspect.
 
We can have no language for discussing what no
 
language or behavior could discriminate. And a differ
 
ence which no language or behavior could convey is,gfor
 
purposes of communication, as good as non-existant.
 
Lewis explains what he meant by a concept which is "common to two minds":
 
The concept is a definitive structure of meanings,
 
which is what would verify completely the coincidence of
 
two minds when they understood each other by the use of
 
the same language. Such ideal conmunity requires coin
 
cidence of a pattern of interrelated connotations, prp­
jected by and necessary to cooperative, purposeful
 
behavior. It does not require coincidence of imagery
 
or sensory apprehension. (Emphasis Lewis).
 
Like Wittgenstein, Lewis stresses the concept and the practical signifi­
icance of the thing or state known:
 
We are concerned with two things in our practical
 
understanding of each other--with communication and with
 
behavior. My eoncepts are, from the outside view of me
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which you have,ggevealed as modes of ray behavior, inclu
 
ding my speech.
 
He continues the paragraph by remarking, "But it is not necessary that
 
when we act aTike we,should feel alike...." (Emphasis Lewis). For
 
Lewis what is important to the psychology of purpose is the "relation
 
between anticipation and realization," and it is only known through
 
behavior. He-emphasized:
 
The eventual aim of communication is the coordi
 
nation of behavior; it is essential that we should have
 
purposes in comraon. But I can understand the purposes
 
of another without presuming that he feels just as I.do
 
when he has them.
 
I do not need to suppose that either purposes in
 
general or the content of this act in particular are, in
 
terms of immediate experience, identical in his g|se and
 
in mine, in order to 'understand his purposes.'
 
, ■ ■ ■ ' f.0 ■ ■ ­
For Lewis, "All meaning is relational," (empahsis his), and"Meanings
 
are identified by the relational patterns which speech and behavior in 
63 ^ ■ 
general are capable of conveying." Thus, even though the sensuous
 
content itself of one mind cannot be conveyed to another, the concept
 
or significance of it is objectified by its relationship to the indi
 
vidual and society. This can be conveyed in speech. Not only were
 
Lewis and Wittgenstein dealing with the same problem, but they reached
 
very nearly the same solution; i.e., that the concept or significance
 
of the phenomena could be objectified and transmitted through language.
 
That was Lewis' position in 1929, twenty-four years ahead of
 
the publication of Wittgenstein's Investigations. By 1941 he adopted
 
a new outlook; one disavowing the verifiability principle and echoing
 
James's The Will to Believe. He noted, "ATT of us who earlier were
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incTined to say that unverifiable statements are meaningless—and I
 
Include myself—have since learned to be more careful."64 Rather,
 
he found that the belief in other eonsciousnesses has "empirical sense"
 
even if it is not verifiable, saying: "We significantly believe in
 
minds other than our own, but we cannot know that such exist. This
 
belief is a postulate." He found the belief in other minds to be
 
similar to the belief in electrons and ultra-violet rays.
 
Lewis put his final stress oh language as the vehicle of
 
education. Because of language humans do not have to learn everything
 
by trial and error or repeat the mistakes of the past. It makes past
 
action a species property:
 
Language is..4essential to that preservation of
 
accumulated learning which is the root factor in the dif
 
ference between human life and that of other Species.
 
It is an indispensable instrument of that continued and
 
progressive human betterment which history reveals.
 
Granted reaT communication, we are warranted in some con­
fidence that there is ndthing which is desirable to men
 
at large, and is attainable by any, v/hich will not be
 
eventually shared by all; nor any common trouble which
 
can be obyiated by any from which all may not eventually
 
■ be freed. 
He continues almost to the point of being Utopian. Progress is con
 
tinually accelerating because language has made social learning a
 
cumulative product.
 
Both Mead and Lewis developed theories of mind as arising out
 
of the action of an organism in its environment. For Mead language
 
is the instrument which creates mind and consciousness, the internal
 
dialogue. In Paul Weiss' words, "The late Professor Mead, though a
 
professed pragmatist, was at heart a metaphysician." Similar to
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the systems of Freud and Marx, to what could one appeal that possibly
 
might prove Mead's theory wrong? For Lewis language is a tool of
 
cooperation and social memory, but not something essential to the nature
 
or existence of the human mind. Rather, he showed what were the limits
 
of using language to talk about consciousness, but did not discuss
 
what he assumes consciousness in itself to be. As Weiss said of
 
Lewis' pragmatism, it is good work but it lacks an explicit formula­
■ go , . 
tion and criticism of the metaphysics which it assumes. Nevertheless,
 
the formal philosophy of pragmatism was kept alive. Thus men such as
 
John Dewey and Signey Hook had a respectable justification to call for
 
radical change in society.
 
 CHAPTER 5
 
JOHN DEWEY T
 
, and
 
THE GREAT DEPRESSION
 
What distinguishes most American socio-economic deter­
minists from the Marxists is a rejection of dialectical materialism
 
and a rejection of the dictatorship of the prpletariat. "Hegelianism"
 
is still present in the notion of conflict and progress. What dis
 
tinguishes pragmatism among the naturalistic philosophies is its em
 
phasis upon action together with its rejection of "metaphysics." All
 
ideas are but probabilities to be tested in action.
 
When Dewey accepted the idea that the underlying cause of
 
social change was neither human nor divine will, it made a profound
 
change in his politics. As far as is known, Dewey's voting record
 
up until the Great Depression was the following: 1896 for Bryan;
 
1912 for Theodore Roosevelt's Bull Moose ticket; 1916 for Wilson;
 
1924 for LaFollette; and in 1928 for AT Smith.^ Dewey made his break
 
with idealism in graduate school in the early eighties. Merle Curti
 
finds evidence of Dewey's social radicalism in his writings as early
 
as 1888.^
 
Dewey always advocated"social change;" a term which may be
 
translated as using government action to improve the conditions of
 
those less fortunate. In terms of the Depression it is significant
 
that he advocated organic change (change from-within and by the existing
 
system) up until the stock market crisis. He voted progressive, but not
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for radical restructuring.
 
In lectures given in 1926 (reprTnted as The Public and Its
 
Problems, 1929) Oewey's tone was pedantic and uninspiring. He never
 
spoke any better than he wrote, and at that time he did not convey
 
any urgency for his social position. Rather, the lectures consisted
 
of a dry analysis with an occasional tone of "wouldn't it be nice if
 
...." Judging by his later writings the following remarks from those
 
1ectures may have been directed at the Republican administratibn:
 
Mo government by experts in which the masses do
 
not have the chance to inform the experts as to their
 
needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed in the
 
interests of the few. And the enlightenment must pro
 
ceed in ways which force the administrative specialists
 
to take account of the needs. i
 
The point is that it is impossible to tell if he meant the Republican
 
administration. Now contrast this with his position five years later:
 
I speak as one who as far back as 1912 hoped for
 
the resurrection of the Republican party, as one who has
 
at times in national elections hoped for a revival within
 
the Democratic party. But at last I am disillusioned;
 
I am humiliated at the length of time it has taken me
 
to pass something like political maturity. For, I sub
 
mit, it is an infantile cherishing of illusions, a with
 
drawal from the realities of economic and political facts,
 
to pin one's hopes and put one's trust on the pos|ibilities
 
of organic change in either of the major parties.
 
Oewey's reaction to the Depression was most noticable in
 
his work for The League for Independent Political Action and in his
 
articles in The Mew Republic. George Dykhuizen has given a good account
 
of his personal letters at this time: he condemned Hoover's lack of
 
action, advocated a planned economy, and saw no real promise in the
 
election of Roosevelt.
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The 1928 election of Herbert Hoover distressed Dewey because
 
he saw it as anathema to progress. He considered the old liberalism
 
which Hoover represented to be based upon a fallacy, the notion that
 
freedom is something expressed negatively (freedom from) and its con
 
sequent embodiment in laissez-faire capitalism:
 
But the course of historic events has proved that
 
they emancipated the classes whose special interests they
 
represented rather than human beings impartially. In
 
fact, as the newly emancipated forces gained momentum, they
 
actually imposed new burdens and subjected to new modes of
 
oppression the mass of individuals who did nog have a
 
privileged economic status. (Emphasis Dewey).
 
Rather, Dewey saw liberty as something both positive and concrete:
 
Well, in the first place, liberty is not just an
 
idea, an abstract principle. It is power, effective
 
power to do specific things. There is no such thing as
 
liberty in general; liberty, so to speak, at large. If
 
one wants to know what the condition of liberty is at a
 
given time, one has to examine what persons can do and
 
what they cannot do. The moment one examines the ques
 
tion from the standpoint of effective action, it becomes
 
evident that the demand for liberty is a demand for power.
 
(Emphasis DeWey).
 
Eventually he came to state his conclusion that politics is basically
 
a struggle for power. He defined politics as, the struggle for
 
possession and use of power to settle specific issues that grow out of
 
the country's needs and problems. ...politics is the struggle for
 
power to achieve results " Thus he holds the Marxist position in
 
so far as dividing freedom into two categories, formal and factual,
 
puts by far the most emphasis on the factual, sometimes exclusively
 
as above, and draws the conclusion that this requires social(ist)
 
economic planning. He writes:
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If we employ the conception of historic relativity,
 
nothing is clearer than that the conception of liberty
 
is always relative to forces that at a given time and
 
place are increasingly felt to be oppressive. Today, it
 
signifies liberation from material insecurity and from
 
the coercions and repressions that prevent multitudes
 
from participation in the vast cultural resources that
 
are at hand. The direct impact of 1iberty always has to
 
do with some class or group that is suffering in a special
 
way from some form of constraint exercised by the distri
 
bution of powers that exists in contemporary society.
 
Should a classless society ever come into being the formal
 
concept of liberty would lose its significance.... (Em
 
phasis Dewey).
 
Dewey's other reason for attributing success to the Repub
 
licans was the fear on the part of the public that another party might
 
upset things. The Republicans, the party of business, supposedly
 
knew how to manage and run affairs in a businesslike way: Hoover,
 
after all, was an engineer. For Dewey this had the ironic effect
 
of proving that the public wanted federal economic management. It
 
was proven again when the public held Hoover accountable for the
 
Depression.
 
Dewey's reaction to the Depression went through a cycle
 
starting with "Fabian" socialism (he never used the term) prior to
 
the stock market crash. Then, after the crash, he opted for a radical
 
socialism calling for a constitutional convention and ignoring the
 
gains of the New Deal. Finally, as the effects of drastic social
 
engineering in Europe became apparent, he drifted back to a low
 
keyed evolutionary socialism.
 
The first period is best represented by the founding of
 
\
 
the League for Independent Political Action (L.I.P.A.) and from
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Dewey's Individualism Old arid New (1930), a collection of essays
 
drawn from his contributions to The New Republic the preceding year.
 
The L. I. P. A. was founded in 1928 as a reaction to Hoover's elec
 
tion. The League's basic contention was that politics and economics
 
had to be squared, and its beacon light was the British Labor Party.
 
The vice president of the League at its inception was Thomas Maurer,
 
Norman Thomas' running mate. Dewey showed up occasionany as a
 
"sympathetic onlooker" but he was nOt a founding member. With the
 
stock market crash in October of 1929, Dewey thought the time was
 
right for change, and became a member; his reputation immediately
 
propelled him to its presidency. With Dewey as president the major
 
task of L. I. P. A. became the education of the American pegple con
 
cerning economics. They hoped to elect someone with their views to
 
the White House by 1940.
 
To do this they advocated the fofmulation of a third party,
 
and Dewey asked Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska, a liberal
 
Republican, to head the new party.'Norris politely refused. His
 
refusal had two consequences: first, it deepened Dewey's suspicions
 
of the collaboration between the old parties and; second, it gained
 
Dewey the animosity of Norman Thomas and the avowed socialists. The
 
press was also harsh on Dewey, both giving the League bad notices and
 
never allowing Dewey column space for interviews. Both the press and
 
the other minor parties considered the League a group of intellec
 
tuals, whereas both the major parties considered it a threat to be
 
defused. Dewey himself may have been partly to blame: he was seventy
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years old the year of the crash, had lived through previous depres
 
sions, and at the start did not express the sense of urgency which
 
is needed in politics. ,
 
However, it was soon apparent that the Depression was
 
worse than anything in meniory--so bad, in fact, that it threatened
 
to be the beginning of the total economic collapse expected by the
 
most radical socialists. By the time of the 1932 elections the
 
League had drawn up a specific platform of eighty-four recommenda
 
tions, including: a quarter-billion dollars in federal funds for
 
jobs; three to five billion for public works; and end to prohibition
 
at the federal level; an immediate twenty-five percent reduction in
 
the tariff; a complete free trade within twenty years; U. S. member
 
ship in the League of Nations; recognition of Soviet Russia; an
 
immediate fifty percent cut in the military budget and a constitut­
tional convention. It was as thorough a socialist program as could be
 
submitted at that time, hedged with words like "eventual" public
 
ownership and recommending ah income tax up to seventy-five percent
 
on the highest earning individuals. Dewey warned that the progressive
 
radicals should do as he did and hedge their socialism in evoTutionary
 
terms; i.e., not advocating it as a forthri.ght politica1 policy. This
 
was because it mi^ht play into the hands of the Facists, whom he was
 
afraid might be in position to compete for power if the whole system
 
collapsed.
 
Unfortunately,Dewey was a bad political tactician. The
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Socialists had held their convention four months ahead of his and had
 
stolen much of his thunder, florman Thomas was calling for most of
 
the same things as Dewey and even admitted the same gradualism in
 
practice. Thomas had the advantage of being an experienced candidate
 
with a pre-existing party, one with its ideology and platform already
 
worked out. Also, the pressure was on for a united front.
 
Dewey had two objections to Thomas. First, Thomas was an ac
 
knowledged socialist; he was identified with socialism. In 1931
 
Dewey wrote: :
 
I think a new party will have to adopt many measures
 
which are now labeled sociali$tic--measures which are dis
 
counted and condemned because of that tag. But while
 
support for such measures in the concrete. . .will win
 
support from American people, I cannot imagine the Amer
 
ican people supporting them on the ground of Socialism,
 
or any other sweeping ism, laid down in advance. The
 
greatest handicap from which special measures favored
 
by the Socialists suffer is that they are advocated by
 
the Socialist party as Socialism. The prejiji^ice against
 
the name may be a regrettable prejudice
 
Rather, he imagined that the majority of reformers, "...all but the
 
most dogmatic Socialists..." would enlist in the new party. As Harold
 
Laski said of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, the left wing founders of the
 
British Labor Party, they were "pragmatists at bottom," and that "Their
 
word did more than that of anyone else to give the doctrine of socialism
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its necessary pragmatic roots in the English scene." Dewey felt that
 
it was only by being such Fabian socialists that people h^ a practical
 
chance at achieving reform. Through education the solutions would
 
suggest themselves to the voting public. Ironically, there is an
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element of PTatonism in Dewey's brand of pragmatism: to know the good
 
Is to do the good, and Dewey depended upon education to make it known.
 
Dewey's second objection was that Thomas was an ideological
 
socialist rather than a practical one. Dewey believed that men would
 
cooperate for the conmon good—once they were properly educated to
 
know what that common good was. Thomas, on the other hand, looked
 
at society in terms of the Marxist class struggle. In responding to
 
Thomas' charge of being a group of do-nothings, late-comers, and Utopian
 
intellectuals, Dewey said:
 
It has been a constant aim of the L.I.P.A. to find
 
labor groups which believe in independent political action,
 
to bring them together, and to carry on education among
 
these labor groups which have not yet seen the light. We
 
are opposed to the defeatest policy which assumes that
 
there can be no effective radical political action in
 
the country until the majority of the population have
 
sunk into the "proletariat." We are not yet convinced
 
that the Socialist,Party has taken the latter position....
 
(Emphasis Dewey).,
 
Whereas Thomas had charged that Dewey's League holds "an intellec­
tualized version of a watered-down socialism," Dewey responded that
 
he was making decisions without regard for dogma. Dewey turned the
 
tables and shoved that Thomas' brand of socialism was as watered-down
 
as his own by pointing out that Thomas was only calling for national
 
ization of the Brinc^ means of production and distribution. In
 
practice, the Socialist Party admitted to the same gradualism that
 
Dewey had recommended in theory. Moreover, Dewey charged the other
 
radicals with alienating the middle class and thus creating an un
 
necessary handicap. This was, perhaps, his best point.
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As can be expected, virtually all the doctrinaire radicals
 
disagreed with Dewey's cooperativism. Even Sidney Hook, his most
 
distinguished convert to pragmatism and admirer:
 
Dewey's idea is a socialized America. In terms
 
of his own position, the only quarrel one can have
 
with him is his failure to appreciate the instrumental
 
value of class struggle rather than class collabora-^
 
tion in effecting the transition from Coij-gorate America
 
to Collective America. , (Emphasis Hook).
 
Hook saw nothing wrong with being a pragmatic Marxist, but neither
 
could he give up the notion of class struggle completely. Actually
 
Dewey would agree since he was trying to unify the lower and middle
 
classes for an attack (at the polls) on the upper. That was one in­
' ■ ' ' ' ' ' 
stance where Dewey was a better tactician than the professionals. He
 
said,"In spite of the disparagin|g tone in which 'bourgeois' is
 
spoken, this is a bourgeois country; and an American appeal couched
 
in the language which the American people understand must start from
 
this fact.
 
With other socialists Dewey was a sort of friendly enemy.
 
He voted for Norman Thomas in 1932. With the Marxists, however, he
 
had more fundamental differences.: He had been to Russia and was
 
among the first to advocate dipiocatic recognition. He had personally
 
inspected their school system andiwas impressed with their dedication
 
and their goals of doing so much Lith so little. Again and again he
 
up the Russian five year plan as examples of "scientific social
 
• ■ T7 ' ■ 
planning" which should be institUjted in the United States. However,
 
he also considered it a fact thatl orthodox communists took their orders
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from Moscow rather than operating directly for the good of human kind.
 
This conclusion was reinforced in 1935 when New York Local No. 5 of
 
the American Federation of Teachers, the teachers' union which he had
 
helped to organize and of which he was a charter member, was brought
 
to a standstill by the Communist Party. Their immediate aim was
 
destructive. Dewey fought back as chairman of the grievance committee
 
and this took much of his time away from the League. (By the time the
 
Conmunist Party sided with Russia in its attack on Poland and Finland
 
it was too late to affect further Dewey's position on either the
 
Depression or the New Deal.)
 
Second; Dewey held an opposing metaphysics or explanation
 
of change. Even though he had an inclination for explaining change
 
dialectically he did not consider it absolutely necessary, nor even
 
desirable in some cases. The preordained acceptance of violence was
 
especially repugnant to him. He noted:
 
Insistence that the use of violent force is in
 
evitable 1imits the use of available intelligence, for
 
whereever the inevitable reigns intelligence cannot be
 
used. Conmi^ment to inevitability is always the fruit
 
of dogma....
 
Rather, like the consensus historians, he held that more change and
 
progress comes about through cooperation than through conflict and
 
violent revolution. Although both Marxists and (Catholic) Thomists
 
consider pragmatism a philosophy of expediency, Dewey believed that
 
the ends are always inherent in the means, and that violent means
 
would always corrupt the ends. The only passage in which Dewey ever
 
advocated force in order to gain his ends v^as written in 1935;
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...when society through an authorized majority
 
has entered upOn the path of social experimentation
 
leading to great social change, and a minority refuses
 
by force to permit the method of intelligent action to
 
go into effect. Then force may be intelligentl^^empToyed
 
to subdue and disarm the recalcitrant minority.
 
Even then he qualified it to the point of meaninglessness.
 
Lastly, Dewey considered Marxism to be a religion. He
 
once confided to Bertrand Russell (another friendly enemy) that since
 
he had gotten over one religion (Hegelianism) he had no intention of
 
accepting another. On this point they both agreed.
 
Dewey prided himself on being undogmatic. Even so, many
 
Marxists considered that he and they had much in common. They saw
 
Dewey as representing a progressive evolutionary step in American
 
thought. For instance, Jim Cork was able to cite nine similarities
 
between Marx and Dewey:
 
1) Both find a common heritage in Hegel...Each in
 
his own way emancipated himself from the idealistic insights
 
of Hegel without sacrificing the great insights of the
 
German philosopher.
 
2) Both consider philosophy as not 'outside' this
 
world and above common human practices, but a very impor
 
tant part of the general culture of any epoch, reflecting
 
its comnon experiences, problems and needs.
 
3) The strong secular, naturalistic note in both
 
philosophers.
 
4) Both are in the materialistic tradition of
 
philosophic thought.
 
5) Both are opposed to atomism, a-priorism, sen
 
sationalism, Platonic essences, and the extremes of both
 
organism and formalism in understanding culture.
 
6) Both are opposed to the traditional philos
 
ophies of dualism (Descartes, Rant, etc.).
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7) Both are opposed to absolute truths in favor
 
of relative and provisional truths dependent for veri
 
fication Und possible further extension) upon future
 
inquire. ^
 
8) Both have a deep appreciation of the facts of
 
biology and accept the philosophical implications of
 
Darwinism,
 
9) Both epistemological theories are practically 21
 
identical. Both stress the unity of theory and practice.
 
What bothered the Marxists principally was that Dewey did not adhere to
 
their plan for revolution, calling instead for mass education rather
 
than class conflict.
 
■V . ■ ■ ' ■ ' . C . . ■
Yet Dewey still can be charged with dogmatism. By the elec 
tion of 1932 there was no package Of mere reform that he was willing to 
accept—not even if it worked. Beginning in 1929 his political state 
ments kept getting stronger, until they reached their most radical and 
uncompromising form in 1935. It may be speculated that the "success" 
of the German National Socialists had as much to do with his return to 
caution as his fear of aiding domestic reactionaries—he considered 
the Union Party (the Coughlin-Lemke-Smith-Towsend coalition) to be a 
group of fascists. 
In 1930 he blamed the private profit system for the country's 
ills: "There lies the serious and fundamental defect of our civili­
zation, the source of the secondary and induced evils to which so much 
op ■ ■ • 
attention is given." He declared that economic causes are "fundamental." 
The traditional kind of rugged and competitive individual had his place 
in the pre-roachine age.; The old individualist had created the indus 
trial state. However, its time is past and we live in a "collective 
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age. As a former Hegelian himself he found it easy to accept the
 
Marxist substructure-superstructure explanation. Again, he accepted
 
it without the encumbrance of a formal theory of dialectics:
 
Our material culture. . .is verging on the
 
collective and corporate. Our moral culture, along with
 
our ideology, is, on the other hand, still structured
 
with ideals and values of an individuali|2j derived from
 
the prescientific, pretechnological age.
 
A new individualism can be achieved only through
 
the controlled use of all the resources of science and
 
technology that have mastered the physical forces of
 
nature.
 
They are not now controlled in any fundamental
 
sense. Rather they control us.
 
He accepted both the Marxist theory of alienation and the basic
 
tenant of Marxist psychology, that consciousness itself is a social pro
 
duct: ~
 
...the relationship of the economic structure
 
to the political operations is one that actively per­
sists. " ■ . ^
 
Indeed, it forms the only basis of present poli
 
tical questions. Wealth, property and the process of
 
manufacturing and distribution—down to retail trade
 
through the chain system--can hardly be socialized in
 
outward effect without political repercussion. It con
 
stitutes the ultimate issue which must be faced by new
 
or existing political parties.
 
He went on to say that"Socialism" is thought of as a bad work by the
 
old individualists, thus seriously handicapping any party by that name:
 
"But in the long run, the realities of the situation will exercise con
 
trol over the connotations which, for historical reasons, cling to the
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word." The inferehce is that socialism conforms with reality.
 
In terms of his own theory of pragmatism this may be criti
 
cized as "faith." His own theory, if consistently applied, would not
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allow him to know any aspect of reality until after it was tested in
 
oractice. As a praqmatist all he had a right to say was that laissez­
faim capitalism had been tried and failed. Politically speaking,
 
Dewey was more than just a pragmatist by 1930: he was committed to a
 
truth which had not yet withstood the test of action, one which was not
 
pragmatically verified. There were other alternatives which might
 
have proved workable, such as the measures of controlled and regulated
 
capitalism offered by the New Deal. However, Dewey maintained that,
 
"We are in for some kind of socialism.... Economic determinism is
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now a fact, not a thoery."
 
By 1931 his tone had become more vicious. The "economically pri
 
vileged" had become his target rather than the private profit system,
 
and he had begun to call them the enemy instead of the problem; "The
 
enemy is one, for its elements are combined to maintain economic
 
on . .
 
privilege in control of government." He called Hoover's "engineering
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mind," "...the servant of capital employed for private profit."
 
He charged that, "The deadlocks and impotence of Congress are definitely
 
the mirror of the demonstrated incapacity of the captains of industry
 
and finance to conduct the affairs of the country prosperously as an
 
32
 incident to the process of feathering their own nests." His criticism
 
had become more specific, directed at particular classes and individuals
 
rather than at the more abstract level. He charged also that the Demo
 
crats had accepted all the same basic assumptions as the Republicans
 
and had "cormiitted themselves to the policy of alliance with big business."
 
Thus there was no hope for basic change to come out of either party;
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their self-interest macfethem intransigent. Property interests always
 
came before human interests. His economic determinism also grew
 
stronger that ydar. He said, "Foi' it is the pressure of necessity
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which creates and directs all political change." Logically speaking,
 
he should not have blamed both the individual culprits and the system
 
that determined their behavior.
 
This trend continued until 1935 when it climaxed in his ad­
. 34

vocating what amounted to censorship and the limited sanction ot
 
violence (see above). His emotion and his authoritarianism grew to
 
gether. Dewey's "Hegelianism" showed up again that year in his state
 
ment that an individual's freedom is realized through acquiescence to
 
collective regimentation: "Regimentation of material and mechanical
 
forces is the only way by which the mass of individuals can be re
 
leased from regimentation and consequent suppression of their cultural
 
possibilities."^^
 
All the evidence points to the fact that Dewey was fully
 
aware of emotionalizing the issues. Consistent with pragmatism, he
 
remarked:
 
Here we come to the nub of the matter. Intelli
 
gence has no power per se. In so far as the older
 
rationalists assumed that it had, they were wrong. Hume
 
was nearer the truth. . .when he said 'reason is |gd

always must be the slave of passion' of interest.
 
Pragmatism itself hinges upon a modification of the behaviorist theory
 
of mind; thinking occurs only when unthinking or habitual behavior is
 
blocked, jit is a form of problem solving behavior. In 1931 Dewey stated:
 
Again, no movement gets far on a purely ihtellec­
tual basis. It has to be emotionalized; it must appeal
 
to social imagination....
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I Everything points to a simple conclusion. The
 
only way to achieve any lasting reform is to |incl the
 
one great issue on which all others converge.

 
Dewey's one great unifying factor was: "Recovery of the agencies of the
 
^ ■ ' 38 
government by the hational community for the service of the nation "
 
He stated that this was not rigid or dogmatic, but that it would pro
 
vide an identifiable enemy. It even provided the sense of conflict
 
' ■ . ■ ■ ' ■ . V ■ ■ . ■' ■ 
needed for a; movement. Furthermore, he could satisfy his own pragmatic
 
theory at the same time by saying, "No commitment to dogma or fixed
 
doctrine is necessary. The program can be defined in terms of direct
 
j , ^ ■ ' 39 ■ ^ 
social neeids and can develop as these change." In the next breath 
he advocated nationalization of the power companies and regulation of 
the stock market. .
 
Of course there is a contradiction between the dogma of
 
socialism itself and the pragmatic dogma of having no dogma, but
 
former Hegislians have only rarely been stopped by contradictions. The
 
actual too]! of transfer that Dewey did propose was taxation:
 
- , . i ■ ■ ■ , ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
jSince private Control of national resources of
 
the lahd with its mines, mineral deposits, water power,-_
 
oil, [and] natural gas, is the stronghold of mon'opolistic
 
privilege, it must be attacked at its fortress. ...taxation
 
of lanid values, which are due to the requirements of society,
 
is thel-only adequate^method. They must. . .pass into the
 
hands pf the public.
 
In 1931 wh^n this was written he still could be called a "Fabian" or
 
evolutionaiy socialist, even though a hurried one. Within another two
 
years he w^s calling for a constitutional amendment that would outlaw
 
all absentee ownership.
 
Dewey was not embittered because Roosevelt Won in 1932. He
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expected ijt. However, he was discouraged by the fact that not even
 
The New Relpublic took his third party movement seriously. A few years
 
later the League died of neglect.
 
Dewey was committed to socialism, and nothing that Roosevelt
 
could have done short of nationalizing the economy v^ould have pleased
 
him. Unlike a good pragmatist, his mind was already made up ahead of
 
time. He lad predicted that anything good which either of the old
 
parties did while in office would be undone if the emergency ended.
 
So, ironically, his estimation of Roosevelt agreed with that of the
 
conservatTie, Peter Viereck: both considered Roosevelt to be a crypto­
conservatile, a harmonizer of the old system while talking as if he
 
represented the new. Whereas Viereck approved, Dewey wrote:
 
The gigantic Roosevelt experiment of 'relief,
 
reform and recovery' showed a definitely new bias, to
 
a controlled and humanized capitalism as contrasted to
 
the brutality of laissez-faire. But the necessary con­
clusiorii seems to be that npvsuch compromise with a de
 
caying system is possible.
 
He said,"And now in its second summer, the Roosevelt experiment is
 
being generally admitted a failure." As totalitarian'elements gained
 
both at home and abroad many liberals began to swing back to Roosevelt,
 
yet Dewey never found much that was good in the New Deal. He wanted
 
strong govelrnment and "social Control" but could say almost nothing
 
positive about how it should work, except to the point to the Russian
 
five year plans.
 
After 1935 he began to mellow. When asked a month before
 
the 1936 election how he intended to vote he replied:
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I intend to vote for Norman Thomas as President.
 
It was a disappointment that no genuine mass third party
 
was organized, especially in view of the fact that the so-

called Union Party is a union of inflationists and semi-

fascist elements. I realize that fear of reactionary
 
Republicanism will lead many to vote for Roosevelt who ^
 
have no faith in the Democratic Party; but I do not believe
 
that the actual difference between the policies of the old
 
parties will be great, whoever is elected. I think the
 
Republican Party is conducting a campaign under false pre
 
tenses.
 
After that time the rise of totalitarianism abroad reached
 
alarming proportions. Dewey always referred to himself as a "social
 
democrat" and believed wholeheartedly in democracy. However, he
 
never did manage to answer the question of what there is in pragmatic
 
Social cortrol that ensures that it will be used for good purposes,
 
As we will see in the next chapter, Benlto Mussolini and Georges
 
Sorel both cited James's pragmatism as thdir basic inspiration.. How,
 
for\instarce, is a dialectic of ideas possible when the government owns
 
the pressl
 
It may be speculated that Dewey's total commitment to
 
socialism reflected his Hegelian background and his deep seated optimism.
 
For Hegel, Marx and Dewey, man's freedom was to be in harmony with his
 
role in a strong state; a state which was responsive to the reasonable
 
general will of Its people. However, it can be shown that"Dewey's
 
actions were in perfect harmony with James's pragmatism. The pragmatist
 
is free tc hold any belief or myth that gives him comfort. As mentioned
 
below, there was no national experience to demonstrate that socialism
 
"worked-," only evidence that no system in the world at that time was
 
1iving up to its expectations. Yet, believing that socialism would
 
improve things might make a difference.
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After the 1936 election Dewey went back to writing on logic
 
and education. Then he went off to Mexico to defend Leon Trotsky. When
 
asked in lj940 how he would vote he responded: "Shall vote for Norman
 
„44

Thomas. See no permanent hope from either of the old parties. At
 
that time ihe was eighty-one. In 1944 he voted for Roosevelt and in
 
i . ■ ^ , ■ ■ 
1948 cast his last ballot for Truman. 
CHAPTER 6
 
FURTHER INFLUENCES OF PRAGMATISM
 
The continuing influences of pragmatism may be subdivided
 
into four areas: first, James's Varieties of Religious Experience
 
is often cited as the first work in the phenomenology of religion. It
 
may have presaged a trend in nominalistic phenomenology.
 
Second; the effects of James's Wi11 to Believe is still
 
strong in religion, where it was first used. Moreover, it has had a
 
stronger effect on politics outside the United States than on religion.
 
Third; the psychology upon which pragmatism is based holds
 
sway throughout the social sciences. It may be Understood as the appli
 
cation of Darwinism to the study of the; human species.
 
Fourth; a whole generation of Americans have had their educa
 
tions shaped by the philosophy ascribed to by John Dewey. Indeed,
 
Dewey's feme rests upon his reputation as the foremost American educa
 
tor, rather than as a stateman or a logician.
 
No work of this length can fully explore any of these four
 
areas. However, the following may help make some of the issues clear
 
and suggest further areas of research. I will begin with the emerging
 
movement of a nominalistic phenomenology.
 
James M. Edie sees William James's phenomenological, or
 
descriptive, study of religion as not only preceding the continentaT
 
phenomenologists, but as still having something to teach them about
 
"the phenomenology of reTigious experience:
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James's methocloTogical contributions to the
 
study of religious experience are not only more sound
 
phenomenologically than some of the studies which have,
 
under the influence of Husserl, up to now explicitly

invoked a phenomenological method, but they are also
 
the filrst to establish any solid ba^is for a true phe
 
nomenology of religious experience.
 
Edie even goes to the extent of asserting that, .the founders and
 
'fathers' of the phenoraenological movement in Europe have given us
 
2 ' ■ ' 
nothing in the way of a phenomenology of religious experience." As
 
Edie sees it, these founders are Husserl, Marleau-Ponty, Gabriel Marcel
 
and even Sartre. He argues that a truly phenomenological study of
 
religion would eschew the current study of the history and sociology
 
of religion. The history, sociology and anthropology of religion are
 
studies of its manifestations, not the essential thing in itself. He
 
states thit an examinatioh of the phenomena of human consciousness will
 
lead back to the actual foundations of religion. "This is the orienta
 
tion of William James in his Varieties of Religious Experience, and this
 
is what distinguishes him from other phenomenologists and philosophers
 
of religion." He even claims that James was more Husserlian than the
 
school which bears the name and says, "I am. . .claiming that William
James was|the first to attempt a phenomenology of religious experience
 
in an experimental sense, and I would point out that he has had almost
 
no successor. . .up to the present time."
 
What Edie fails to notice is the one thing that makes James's
 
"phenomenology" unique: the fact that it stresses variety and subjectiv
 
ity; in short, its pluralism. This is an essential aspect Of James's
 
pragmatism and may be the explanation as to v/hy he has not influenced
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continental phenomenology. The continental phenomenologists are
 
committed to a search for objective essential structures which are the
 
same for all persons. They are Realists. Hence, this serves to ex
 
plain why James did not have a major effect in this area. What effect
 
there has been is evidenced by the fact that people such as Edie are
 
stiIT calling for a nominalistic phenomenology.
 
On the other hand, the effects of James's Will to Believe
 
are numerous and far reaching. The most obvious of these effects is in
 
religion. Some philosophers, but especially theologians, are still
 
willing to say that the "leap of faith" is both necessary and justified.
 
Paul Van Buren, for example, begins with a purely nominalistic approach:
 
I point out that as a theologian, not a philosopher,
 
T see the problem of contemporary philosophy from a certain
 
angle and in connection with particular problems. Whatever
 
limitations this particular approach may have, it is part
 
of what I wish to argue on James's behalf that its particu
 
larity is not only no disqualification, but simply the
 
only way to procied, frankly accepting one position in the
 
context of many. i
 
He agrees that there are places where people are simply forced to hold
 
a belief one way or another without adequate evidence--such as whether
 
or notlife is worth living. Such beliefs as these do make a differ
 
ence and actually tend ^ t bring about their own truth; for instance,
 
lifesreaily becomes worth living. Then Van Buren points out that,
 
"...Jlraes focused on two sorts of questions, the moral and the religious..."
 
and the important fact of the matter is that, "Neither logical demon
 
stration nor empirical verification will be able to settle these
 
questians." The frame of reference for the existence of a proof is
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missing. "In an important and unavoidable way, facts are man-made."^
 
As will be seen later, this religious nominalism will lead Van Buren
 
to advocate an affiliation between James and Wittgenstein.
 
Predictably, The Will to Believe had as much effect, if not
 
more, on European political theory than it did in religion. H. S.
 
Thayer credits the French philosopher, Georges Sorel, with being a
 
' O ■ 
variety of pragmatiSt. (This is quite a concession on Thayer's part,
 
since he is a consistent defender of pragmatism and is especially fond
 
of James.) Sorel reflects the Bergsonian anti-intellectual sort of
 
pragmatism that stems directly from The Will to Believe. Believing
 
in certain myths--particularly the myth of the general strike--will
 
not only justify violent actions, but even bring them about. For
 
Sorel, like James, there is a sense in which believing makes it so.
 
Thayer says, "There are clearly certain broad similarities
 
between Sorel's view of the function of the myth for social groups and
 
James' argument in The Will to Believe concerning the benefits of
 
n, ■ . ■ 
belief to certain individuals." The difference in application was
 
thati whereas James saw that belief might comfort and motivate indi
 
viduals, Sorel saw that they might solidify and motivate whole masses..
 
Since his time it has been recognized that ;almost all mass movements
 
require an ideology, no matter how strange or absurd it might be.
 
It is "pragmatic" when one makes use of the principle that the Chicago
 
sociologist, W. I. Thomas, discovered while researching The Polish
 
Peasjant in Europe and America: "That which is believed to be real is
 
realMn its consequences." What James had not done, and what he was
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criticized bitterly for, was to overlook the important distinction
 
betwjeen ontologic reality and consequential reality.
 
According to Thayer, "It was in 1921, in De 1'utili§ du
 
Praqmatisme, that Sorel stated his partial acceptance of James's
 
pragmatism and argued for its 'usefulness' as a means of settling
 
controversies."^^ James had written The Will in the context of the
 
battle between established religion and evolutionary naturalism. What
 
Sofek did not lite about James was his Protestantism, but, like others,
 
it was something that he could dispense with without changing the method
 
ology that was the core of pragmatism.
 
Both James and Sorel had a great influence in Italy. Thayer
 
quotes a revealing passage from an interviev; with Mussolini in the
 
London Sunday Times of April 11, 1926:
 
I The pragmatism of William James was of great use
 
to me in my political career. James taught me that
 
action should be judged rather by its results than by
 
its doctrinary basis. I learnt of James that faith in
 
action, that ardent will to live and figh^-j to which
 
Fascism owes a great part of its success. 
" ■ I . ■ ■ ■ . "\ 
Benito Mussolini had even been a member of a group that called itself 
12
 
"The Pragmatic Club."
 
Praqmatismo can be traced directly to James. Its foremost
 
native spokesman was Angel0 Papini (1881-1956), who met James in Rome
 
in l!505i He already had a very high regard for James and afte|r the
 
meeting came almost to idolize him. They continued to exchange letters,
 
with James forming a very high opinion of Papini, almost to the point of
 
seeiijig bis own reflection in him. According to Thayer, "James had. . .
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begun to think Of pragmatism as a philosophy, a program, a world-wide
 
intellectual movement of which he was the founder; and after meeting
 
the Italians, he was suddenly conscious of being the leader."13 He
 
even wrote articles on Papini and Pragmatismo.
 
It was not long until the Italian pragmatists came under
 
attack from two directions. The first was the Catholic Church which
 
saw I pragmatismo as a form of Modernism--a way of thinking which it
 
pronounced heretical. The second came from the Italian academic phil
 
osophers, such as Benedetto Croce. After James died, the two major
 
Italian pragmatists, Vailati and Calderoni, died in 1907 and 1914,
 
resp|ctively, and Papini converted to Christian mysticism. Italian
 
pragmatism flourished for only ten years and died in the disillusion
 
ment of the Great War. However, that high point coincided with the
 
formative years of II Puce. Papini said, "From induction by Will to
 
Believe, there is given a single aim: aspiration to be able to act
 
(Wilje zur Macht). With the help of other European influences the
 
1 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■ ■ ■■ ' ■ . . ■■ ■ ■ ■ ■■ ■■ . ' ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■ ■ ■ 
"will to believe" became the transition to the "will to power."
 
The most pronounced and continuing effect of pragmatism
 
outside the United States was in England. James's pragmatism reached
 
England first and, according to Thayer, ^
 
The most famous pragmatist outside the United
 
tates was Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller (1864-1937).
 
t the height of his influence early in the present
 
entury, Schiller was regarded the equal of James as
 
Ijeading spokesman for pragmatism. On the continent,
 
far more attention was directed to the works of James
 
and Schiller than to any of the other pragmatists.
 
However, unlike James, by mid-century his name had vanished so completely
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that people mistook his name for that of the German poet.
 
Schiller was quite influenced by James and, according to
 
Thayer, "He attempted to persuade James to drop the name pragmatism in
 
favoif of humanism. For humanism, Schiller contended, represented the
 
■ 16 
broader movement into which pragmatism fitted as a part." That may
 
have been the best insight of his career, except that he failed to
 
notice that Fascism was also a part of that movement. Still, one
 
might argue that the popularity of Fascism was, in part, due to the
 
factIthat it posed as a brand of humanism.
 
^ Like his friend James, Schiller was a good writer and the
 
creation that he most admired was The Will to Believe. James tried
 
to direct his attention to Dewey and the Chicago School, but Schiller
 
was not interested in their social philosophy. Like James, he was a
 
romantic individualist.
 
Schiller was a Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford,
 
wherd he did most of his writing; the Idealist, F. H. Bradley being
 
for nim what Royce was for James, He came to America in 1893 in
 
order to get a Ph.D. at Cornell, but failed in the attempt and went
 
back to Oxford. Then in the last ten years of his life he taught at
 
the Lniversity of Southern California, thayer speculates that it was
 
Schi1ler's intense antagonism to Bradley that resulted in his being
 
forced to leave Oxford. G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell first rose
 
to fame in England for attacking the Hegelians. The difference was
 
that their attack was more analytic than rhetorical. Starting in 1908
 
they began to turn that attack on the pragmatists.
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Two British philosophers of roore contemporary significance
 
are % P. Ramsey and Ludwig Wittgenstein, It is a fact that the works
 
of b 3th James and Dewey were known in England well before World War I
 
losophical books and journals were published in the U.S. and
 
Britain simultaneously and people such as Schi11er had openly acknowl­
edged their indebtedness to pragmatism. The mathematical and logical
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work of Peirce was acknowledged by Russell, Schroder, and Keynes.
 
Peir :e carried on correspondence with other British philosophers who
 
were interested in the problem of meaning. According to Thayer,
 
"Russel1's frequent references to Peirce and his recognition of Peirce's
 
iraportant contribution to the algebra of logic are evident in the
 
Principles."^^ j
 
F, P. Ramsey (1903-1930) was a Cambridge philosopher and
 
mathematician. He was a friend of Wittgenstein and his first published
 
work was an outstanding review of Wittgenstein's first work, the
 
Trajtatus. Ramsey's review and the fractatus both came out in 1922,
 
and Ramsey made explicit use of Peirce's logical distinctions in his
 
criticism. In the last three years of his short life Ramsey was to
 
cite! Peirce again and again. Peirce, but not James, could be cited
 
to cjriticize the norainalists.
 
For instance, one of the greatest problems in the philos
 
ophy of mathematics and epistemology is the justification of the method
 
of induction. Ramsey found Peirce's ideas to be the best solution
 
here: true thebries work because__of their inherent truth. Thus it is
 
''reasonable." It should be noted, however, that the more rigorous
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BertrandRusselT continued to refer to this as one of the skeletons in
 
the closet of philosophy, Thayer says, "The pragmatism of Ramsey is
 
clear. It is derived mostly from Peirce, but perhaps also from James's
 
disci|ssion of the connection between belief and ways of acting. It was
 
1 ■' 19 ■ ' 
Wittgenstein, however, who took considerable interest in James."
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), a Fellow of Trinity College,
 
is certainly among the most famous philosophers of the century. Thayer
 
holds that the influence of Ramsey, shown by Wittgenstein's repudiation
 
of tpe Tractatus and his last work. The Philosophical Investigations,
 
"...hrings the philosophy of Wittgenstein into very basic harmony with
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pragiTatism." He finds three reasons for this in the Investigations.
 
First, he changed from the notion of formal objective language struc­
ture to the notion that the usage and context determine what is correct.
 
Seconp, instead of an attempt to "picture" or correspond to the objec
 
tive world, the meaning and usage of language is a behavioral phenomenon,
 
subject to cultural relativity. Third, his theory of language as re­
gardsiprivate states of mind (e.g., "love,""fear,""pain," "pleasure")
 
may bi described as a sort of verbal behaviorism. (Thayer never
 
actually uses the term "behaviorism," but, for reasons which shall
 
folio(V, he could just as well have.)
 
Thayer noted,"The resulting inquiries in the Investiga­
tions, in both their critical and positive conclusions, are very much
 
in accord (sometimes coinciding remarkably) with the outlook of Dewey
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and Mead." Wittgenstein had come all the way from an affinity with
 
Peirce to a radical linguistic nominalism. Thayer notes that.
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"...Wittgenstein often referred to James in his lectures, and for a time
 
James's Psychology was the one book that he kept in his sparsely fur­
22
 
nished room."
 
As noted earlier. Van Buren sees a connection between James
 
and Wittgenstein. He speculates that there is a similarity of basic
 
'■style'' between James and contemporary ordinary language philosophi­
■ ■ pO"'
zing. Speaking directly of James he wrote, "His pragmatism was a 
rough anticipation of the use theory of words: find the cash value of 
. . ■■ ■ ; . ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■ ■ ■ ■ ■ : ■ . ■ ■ ■ ■ - ■ ' ■ 1 ■ • ■■ ■ 
a word, see how the word is used, its 'particular go,' and a problem 
OA 
can be dissolved, James argued." Although Van Buren does not make 
this explicit, his use of the word"dissolve" here is to remind the 
reader of Wittgenstein's constant use of the term "evaporate." 
These are, in fact, used to express the same theme: clear up the se 
mantic problems, and the philosophical ones will disappear. 
It is interesting to note the radical Wittgensteinian ex 
tent to which Van Buren, the theologian, can take linguistic philosophy. 
"The question about the world is always the question of what we say 
about the world, but how we are to speak, and it is solely of our 
25 .speaking that the question of truth is in order." "Life and language 
are one, for James as for Wittgenstein, and to speak of life is to take 
• 26 a Step into life's future, following the leading of our language." 
("Consciousness" would have been a better word for Van Buren to use than 
"life.") He suggests that theology could profit by seeing its problems 
as just so many sides of the same coin--one created by language and, at 
the same time, overcome by a pragmatic qonception of language. 
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It is often speculated that pragmatism never died; it just
 
changed names variously in order to avoid being associated with all the
 
criticism directed at William James. James's pragmatism, especially
 
his"cash value" notion of truth and "believing makes it so" view of
 
reality, became a focal point for critics. Philosophers who are sympa
 
thetic to James, such as H. S. Thayer, refer to this misfortune as"the
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inheritance of uncompleted theory." The implication is that James
 
bore the brunt;of the assault, while it was for others, such as Dewey,
 
Mead, and Lewis to firm up the theories which he had only put forth in
 
rough form.
 
Dewey saw the pre-Darwinian view of life as teleological: unlike
 
the random changes of the elements, living things went through dis
 
tinct cycles which culminated in an example of a particular kind, and
 
which gave birth to a new orderly cycle of life. There were distinct
 
natures and proper ends for all life, with individuals more or less
 
fulfilling those natures and ends. The important thing was that these
 
goals are independent of the individuals, functioning as something
 
constant and objective by which they can be judged. What Dewey spoke
 
against is a classical realist view.
 
The design argument thus operated in two direc
 
tions. Purposefulness accounted for the intelligibility
 
of nature and the possibility of science, while the ab
 
solute or cosmic character of this purposefulness gave
 
sanction and worth to the moral and religious endeavors
 
of man. Science was underpinnedpind morals authorized
 
by one in the same principle....
 
But, "The Darwinian principle of natural selection cut straight under
 
this philosophy."29 After Darwin the philosopher has a different task:
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"Philosophy forswears inquiry after absolute origins and absolute final
 
ities in order to explore specific values and specific conditions that
 
generate them."
 
Interest shifts from the wholesale essence back
 
of special changes to the question of how special changes
 
serve and defeat concrete purposes; ...shifts from the
 
ultimate goal of good to the direct increments of justice
 
and happiness; that intelligent administration of existent
 
conditions may beget....
 
For Deweyi "The influence of Darwin upon philosophy re
 
sides in his having conquered the phenomena of life for the principle
 
of transition, and thereby freed the new logic for application to
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mind and morals and life." Speaking of the old philosophical
 
problems, he sees that something unexpected happens when they are
 
approached from the standpoint of an altogether new method. "We do
 
not solve them: we get over them. Old questions are solved by dis­
appearing, evaporating, while new questions take their place,u33
 
could make a lengthy comparison at this point with Wittgenstein, who
 
"solved" all the problems of philosophy by "dissolving" them with his
 
method.) ;
 
The preceedihg direct quotes have all come from Dewey's
 
essay The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy. This influence has
 
been apparent to virtually everyone who has made a study of full-

fledged pragmatism. Merle Curti found that Dewey's switch from a
 
divine to an evolutionary theory of mind actualTy increased his
 
optimism. For the vast majority of pragmatists (excluding Thorstein
 
Veblen) the notion of evolution implied that things were always
 
getting better--it almost sounds like a contradiction to say that
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anything might evolve or progress for the worse. According to Merl
 
Curti» .Dewey has laid stress on the potentiality of remaking for
 
the better both man and society through the planned application of the
 
experimental method "34 The old problems had been persistent, "But
 
once the full implications of evolution were grasped, all ideas and
 
values were to be thought of in terms of origin and process; then it
 
35.
 
became natural to view life itself as an experiment. "
 
In some respects Dewey stems from the eighteenth
 
'eentury philosophers of the Enlightehment; like some of
 
them he conceives of human nature as plastic in charac
 
ter and capable of improvement through improved social
 
environment. What distinguishes him is his emjDhasis
 
upon education, the community (as opposed to thOoindi­
vidual) and the new nineteenth century sciences.
 
The progressive education movement reflected
 
more, indeed, than the application of pragmatism and
 
instrumentalism to education. It reflected the im
 
pact of the doctrine of evolution itself. ­
The implications for today's philosophies of mind, language
 
and logic are equally revolutionary, and serve to make the transition
 
to the instrumentalist program of education more comprehensible.
 
In 1973 T. A. Goudqe wrote an article titled. Pragmatism's
 
Contribution to an Evolutionary View of Mind.
 
The pragmatists were the first group of philos
 
ophers to work out in detail a philosophy of mind based
 
on evolutionary principles. Moreover, since they were
 
familiar with classical ideas in the field, they were
 
able to assess the kinds of changes in these ideas which
 
evolutionary principles required.
 
He agrees that the adaptive use of language is especially important to
 
the formation of the human mind. From this it is clear that mind is a
 
social product. Dewey asked the rhetorical question, "Would we have
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any IntellectuaT operations without the language which is a social pro­
duct?"^^ In 1931 he stated;
 
The psychological tendencTes which have exerted
 
an influence on instrumentalism are of a biological rather
 
than a psychological nature.. They are, more or less,
 
closely reTated to the important movement whose promoter
 
in psychology has been Doctor John Watson and to which he
 
has given the name Behaviorism.
 
Although Dewey and Mead were personal friends of Watson at
 
Chicago, Dewey cotild never wholly accept the classical conditioning of
 
Pavlov and Watson. In 1896 in a paper titled The Ref1ex Arc Concept of
 
Psychology he showed that the atomistic approach to stimulus and response
 
did not allow for lapses of tiine between the two, nor did it leave much
 
room for the individual to work actively to transform his society. The
 
Pavlovian-Watsonian organism is a passive creature, merely reacting
 
upon its environment. Thayer says that this paper
 
...was an important event in the history of
 
Anerican psychology.... This was a biological and
 
evolutional psychology. Functional psychology took
 
as its basic data not alleged psychic events, but
 
behavioral processes in biologicaT and social con
 
texts. The Chicago group gave birth to what was to
 
be known as "social behaviorism."
 
Dewey was significant in that he changed the behavioristic model from
 
an atomistic one to one of a much more organic nature. The contextual
 
nature meant that the organism itself was a part of the environment
 
that it was responding to. It is a very clever device for saying
 
that human beings can manipulate their environment, even though they
 
are not really free.
 
The most mature and refined philosophy of mind stemming
 
directly from the above is the operant conditioning of B. F. Skinner.
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Skinner says that, "Without the help of a verbal community all behavior 
'■ 42' ■ ■ 
would be unconscious. Consciousness is a social product." "We 
learn to see that we are seeing only because a verbal -community arranges
 
for us to do so." "The heart of the behavionst position on conscious
 
experience may be summed up in this way: seeing does not imply some­
' 44■ , ' ■ 
thing seen." 
What this social concept of language, thought and conscious 
ness does to formal logic hardly needs explaining. Morton White notes 
that "Dewey, Holmes, and Veblen were the leaders of the campaign to 
mop up the remnants of formal logic, classical economics, and juris­
■ 45' ■' ■■prudence in America." 
By 1897 the outline of what I have called 'the
 
Itberal ideology' had been drawn. It was antiformalist,
 
evolutionary, historically oriented; it was deeply con
 
cerned with the economic aspects of society. ...Pragma

tism was already a national password. 
White combined Dewey, Veblen, Holmes, Robinson and Beard as one group. 
In spite of all his classical training and scholarship. Holmes was 
identified as a pragmatist because of his statement in the Lochner 
dissent that the life of the law was not one of logic. The outgrowth 
of this social philosophy of mind was the modern notion that one's 
environment--not the person himself--is responsible for his actions; 
and the way to make better persons is to meke better, healthier, en 
vironments. Darnell Rucker wrote: 
The Chicago group represented an important shift
 
in thinking away from belief in a world as a given ex
 
ternal reality and mind as a different, internal reality.
 
Mind, thought, and consciousness are explained as
 
products of active processes involving a number of agents.
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There is no isolated individual who must be somehow ex
 
ternally connected with other individuals to form a
 
society. The very process which gives rise to human
 
beings is a social one: hence agents are essentially
 
social beings.
 
The Chicago Philosophy derived largely from de
 
velopments in psychology, just at the time that psychol
 
ogy was beginning in earnest to separate itself in the
 
academic world from philosophy. If psychology was initially
 
subordinated to philosophy departmentally at Chicago, the
 
tail may have been said to have wagged the dog.
 
He goes on to point directly "the dependence of philosophy upon psychol
 
ogy." It bears repeating that the pragmatism of James began as an out
 
growth of his psychology.
 
The most important consequences of the evolutionary, nomin
 
alistic, pragmatic philosophy may be in education. Thayer clarifies
 
Dewey's puzzling statement that the educational process "has no end
 
beyond itself." This becomes clear in the light of his assumption that
 
AO
 
"growth itself is the Only moral 'end'." "He also meant that the edu
 
cational process is not subordinate to any other, nor a means to any
 
thing else, to any process or social institution; just as life has no
 
■ ' ■ .49
end but itself." The underlying theory of evolution is evident.
 
According to John ChiIds,
 
It is doubtful;..whether any thinker has contributed
 
. as much as Dewey to the development of a theory of human
 
behavior and mind which is consonant with the principle
 
that man is an emergent within a natural evolutionary
 
process, and which undertakes to account for his rational
 
powers wjthout any resort to any kind of transcendental
 
; forces. ■ ,
 
The philosopher-educator most in line with Dewey is Sidney
 
Hook. He sees Dewey's criterion of growth as the aim of education as
 
essentiai to democracy. "Education for growth, then, goes hand in hand
 
118
 
with education for democracy and a justification of one is tantamount 
51' ' ■ 
to a justification of the other." U|ltimately he sees the consequences
 
of democracy—and, thus, education for democracy--as being better than
 
all the other alternatives. His justification is "pragmatic" in the
 
sense that it is based on consequences, rather than principles. When
 
comparing democracy to other forms of social organization, he says:
 
...we can point to consequences of the following
 
type: it makes for greater tranquility, justice, freedom
 
security, creative diversity, reasonableness, and less
 
cruelty, insensitiveness and intellectual intolerance
 
than any otheK social system than has so far been devised
 
or proposed.
 
Apparently he has too much optimism to consider the possibility Of a
 
"tyranny of the majority," or not enough idealism to reflect that there
 
may be some principles which should not be subjected to the vote.
 
However, Hook brings his own ideals to bear very effectively
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on the Thomists, Adler and Hutchins. He does so by showing that
 
their position denies the possibility of change or evolution in human
 
nature. Education can be uniform only if human nature is something
 
real and uniform--something objective and unchanging. This boils down
 
to either an abstract rationality or a spirit as what is meant by
 
"human nature." So, he throws the burden of proof back to,the Thomists
 
to convince him and everyone else that this is the case. Using them
 
as a model or paradigm case, he also brushes aside all other "meta
 
physical" views of human nature and their claims upon education. Yet,
 
he does recognize the objectivity of the "science" which he accepts:
 
"A teacher is not disloyal who teaches the theory of evolution in a
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fundamentalist community." He never squares this with his definition
 
of a good education: "We may define a good education as one that plays
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a certain integrative role within its culture...." The fact is that
 
he never examines his own metaphysical assumptions: change means
 
evolution, evolution means progress, and progress is good.
 
J. L. Childs examines three representative, but divergent,
 
avowed pragmatists in education: Kilpatrick, Counts, and Bode. William
 
H. Kilpatrick stresses the role of education in building character.
 
Childs cites his group as the most influential group in the new educa­
56
tion movement, and goes on to cite Dewey's admiration of him. The
 
one thing that he detested most about his own formal education was
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that it was book-centered. This tends to cut students off from the
 
totality of life and turns many of them away from school.
 
For Kilpatrick, education is conceived not pri
 
marily as preparation for a remote and vague future, but
 
rather as vital and meaningful response to the demands
 
of the present. Education, as he interprets it, is not
 
a process of memorization. . .from the Standpoint of the
 
development of the child, the fatal weakness of book-

centered education is that^the essential character buil
 
ding is absent, namely, behaving in a 1ife situation.'
 
The crucial test of learning is not the ability of the
 
child to recite what he has studied, it is rather the
 
ability of the child to respond to actual 1ife circum
 
stances with enriched meaning and added power of control.
 
(Emphasis Childs). >
 
"Thus in the educational theory of Kilpatrick the evolutionary theory
 
of human behavior, the method of experimental science, and the ethic of
 
democracy have been combined to emphasize the wholehearted purposeful
 
59 ,
 
act in the education of the young." Kilpatrick's "law" of learning
 
is reminiscent of Watson and Skinner: "We learn what we live.... We
 
learn our responses, only our responses, and all our responses.
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George S. Counts viewed the edueational process as an in
 
duction into society. Like kilpatrick, he "adopted the orientation
 
of evolutional naturalism," and took "a functionalist view of man
 
and culture...." Unlike Dewey and Kilpatrick, Counts was concerned
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with the need of pupils to acquire basic skills. This is a critical
 
part of their introduction, one which underlies the ability to do
 
"meaningful" things well. He saw that without rigor and mastery of
 
specific basic skills little can be accomplished.
 
His goals were the same as Dewey's, so he was also against
 
the traditional method of rote learning. He saw Dewey's new education
 
as having carried a healthy reaction to an extreme and consequently
 
argued for the need for both meaning and ability. Yet, he found the 
new education preferable to the old system. 
63 
Counts found three major faults in the new education:
 
first, it overemphasized the idea of the child's freedom at the expense
 
of what is "imposed" on them by adults. Second, he disagreed with the
 
notion that modern science and technology has Speeded up social evolu
 
tion to the point where there is no dependable means of knowing what
 
particular things children should learn for tomorrow's world. The
 
third factor is the new education's failure to confront and clarify
 
the conflicting social theories of the society of which it is a part.
 
Its own ends were too vague to ensure that they did not become corrupt
 
or perverted.
 
As a result of his firsthand study of European and Asian
 
educational systems, Counts found American faith in the necessary
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connection between education and enlightenment to be naive. He ob
 
served that some of the most authoritarian states spend vast sums on
 
education, and concluded that the purpose of education will eventually
 
be decided by external forces, not educators.
 
Because of his work in history, sociology, anthropology and
 
education. Counts ultimately stressed the close connection of educa
 
tion to society^ "In his opinion, the distinctive hole of the school
 
is to give the young the vision, the knowledge, and the methods and
 
techniques of thought that will enable them to carry the responsi­
■ 65 ■ ' bilities that Americans must carry in this period." In this, he
 
was certainly a pragmatist. His respect for foundations, wide back
 
ground and a healthy dose of cynicism place him among the most pro
 
mising of the philosophers of the new education.
 
Another pragmatic educator, BoydH. Bode, was chairman of
 
the Department of Principles of Education at Ohio State University.
 
He saw the process of education as a reconstruction of experience.
 
He is a pragmatist in that his major concern was with what he saw as
 
a traditional dichotomy between theory and practice. Also, he did
 
not reject the stimulus-response notion of behaviorism altogether,
 
just the early atomistic version that the pragmatists had already re
 
jected. Rather, he sought an explanation of mind and learning which
 
would leave a place for meaning and purpose. Thus, he gave much time,
 
to refuting the strictly "behavioral" methods of learning. "We do
 
not educate for a majority and freedom when we turn our pupils into
 
docile subjects and subject them to an authoritarian program whose
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life significance they do not grasp."
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Bode had three criticisms of the new pragmatic education:
 
first, there was an over-emphasis on the child's "felt needs." This
 
stresses the subjectivity of the child at the expense of the objec
 
tive needs and requirements of his. culture. Second, he saw that "in
 
cidental learning" will never cover all aspects of life, and held that
 
learning itself can be meaningful. This is a position half way be
 
tween Kilpatrick and Counts on the subject of rigor and discipline.
 
Third, he believed that the new education's emphasis on growth had
 
over-extended the notions of freedom and democracy at the expense of
 
"social orientation."
 
Our task as educators in not to spoil children
 
by indulging them, but to evoke their deeper interests
 
by showing them the way in which the various activities
 
of the school are significantly related to preparing gg
 
them for effectual sharing in the common way of life.
 
Like Counts, he feels that specific subject matter has an important place.
 
However, like all pragmatists, he also feels that whatever objectivity it
 
may have is merely a social matter.
 
ChiIds notes:
 
A. . .factor which led the pragmatists to stress
 
the role of the child in the life of the school is their
 
evolutionary view of behavior as a process of never-ending
 
adjustment to surroundings. They stress that it is
 
through these adjustive acts that habits are developed
 
and attitudes are formed. Since we learn as we do and
 
undergo and consciously relate what is done with what
 
is undergone, habits and attitudes cannot be bestowed
 
upon a child no matter how resourceful the teacher.
 
, They must rather be learned and earned through his own
 
purposeful activity.
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The picture Childs has just given is one of a pupil in an
 
enormous Skinner-box, in the "process of never-ending adjustment to
 
surroundings." When he is "hungry" for some education he will do just
 
enough "adjusting" to slake his hunger. This, in fact, is all that
 
can be meant by "purposeful activity."
 
Actually, the assumption of neurological homostasis which
 
underlies the pragmatic (problem solving) theory of thinking and
 
learning has long since been discredited. (This assumption prevented
 
Dewey from accepting an intrinsic theory of aesthetics.) However,
 
there are more general criticisms of Dewey's pragmatism, and they take
 
both analytic and personal tones.
 
As a former pragmatist herself, Asher Moore criticizes
 
the pragmatic movement in such a personal manner as to be poetic. She
 
finds two major objections; first, it failed to be objective and;
 
second, it over-emphasized the future to the point where it could not
 
cope with either the past or the present—and the future never arrived.
 
The youthful boisterousness which made pragma
 
tism unable to learn from history made it also impatient
 
of the slowness, the technicality, the abstractness, and
 
the chilly dryness which are the scientific reality. It
 
tried to be tough-minded, but for lack of being single-

minded, it lacked self-definition.
 
In one more attempt to get students of the human
 
ities to swallow at least a token bit of scientific
 
medicine, an American university recently offered a course
 
called "Physics for Poets." I fear that pragmatism was
 
Scientific Philosophy for Poets.
 
This criticism is that pragmatism did not fall into either
 
of what she sees as the two major modern philosophical paths: the
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"scientific" (analytic and positivistic) and "humanistic" (which is more
 
honorific in the sense of the word "philosopher", such as Kiekegaard,
 
Nietzsche, Santayana and Buber). One could take this scheme of hers
 
and do something which she only hinted at: it is possible to say
 
that there were simply no great "humanists" after James and Dewey
 
who were willing to call themselves pragmatists. However, Moore
 
just can not bring herself to put either of them on a level with a
 
Santayana or a Buber.
 
Perhaps this is because they were not "wise" enough to
 
live in the present: her second objection. Even in fragments this
 
comes across best in her own words.
 
...Pragmatism was not monstrous, and it did not
 
deny intrinsic value. But what it emphasized was the
 
good which is to be found not in the whole, but in the
 
future, and not through philosophy, which teaches us to
 
love what is, but through science and action, which change
 
it. As Nietzsche said, the present is a tightrope to the
 
future, but whereas Nietzsche saw that the present is al
 
ways present, so that whatever truth and happiness there
 
is must be found on the rope, pragmatism looked forward
 
to the actual coming of a better future.. The other
 
pasture, it thought, actually could be made greener. Its
 
Good News was not of a Savior but of the Promised Land.
 
The Promised Land was a mirage which vanished in
 
the concentration camps and undergrounds of Hitler's
 
Europe.
 
It had failed her as a science and it had failed her as a vehicle of
 
wisdom to live by. She attributed it to ybuth--both hers and that of
 
the new sciences.
 
There was another way that Dewey lost popularity with the
 
intellectuals: this was when he showed that his pragmatism could be
 
 125
 
used 	to justify U. S. entry into World War I. One vocal critic of the
 
war, 	R. Bourne, ..thought of pragmatism as a philosophy of technique,
 
a philosophy which tells you how to accomplish your ends once your ends
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have 	been established." Bourne was a liberal, and the first on the
 
left to openly attack pragmatism. Whate sayS:
 
Bourne's outlook and attitude toward Dewey's prag
 
matism impressed itself on the literary left in the
 
twenties, when Dewey was viewed as safe and professional.
 
Bourne's attack on Dewey in 1917 was based upon dis
 
appointment. Dewey had served as a symbol of intelligent
 
humanitarianism, of a desire to mold society in the
 
interests of peace, economic security, and freedom. His
 
Support of the war, therefore, came as a shock to those
 
who saw it as a direct contradiction of all these values.
 
Dewey ceased to be the gentle, sage spokesman of creative
 
'	 liberalism in certain quarters. Like the German Social
 
Democrats, he was described as the philosophical represen
 
tative of a selling-out movement, a failure^to face the
 
crisis which the war presented to liberals.
 
From 	that time on, pragmatism was open to the charge of being
 
a philosophy of technique by both liberals and conservatives. Marxists
 
were 	justified in making the same basic criticisms as the Thomists:
 
change alone does not equate with evolution, progress or goodness.
 
This 	was not helped any by the fact in his early writings Thorstein
 
Veblen always associated being "pragmatic" with "business" and expediency
 
(as opposed to "industry"). World War II helped to confirm Bourne's
 
criticisms.
 
A third major difficulty with Dewey's pragmatism stemmed
 
from 	its foundation in the theory of evolution. The lack of concrete
 
subject matter in education was but a small scale reflection of the
 
fact that it was incapable of concrete programs anywhere.
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Liberalism faced the danger of trying to be coherent without
 
forming a set of doctrines which would someday become reactionary.
 
According to Morton White, "Liberalism as Dewey defines it, in an effort
 
to escape this dilenima, is hardly more than a proposal that we apply
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the so-called scientific method of intelligence to social problems."
 
For White, "This Tack of clarity obscured a good deal of Dewey's polit­
7fi
 ical thinking in the twenties." Dewey was bound in a contradiction.
 
He was afraid of setting up concrete theories or ends which might end
 
up as unalterable dogma. Yet he wanted to be a social engineer. Thus
 
he was bound--by his dual convictions—to be ineffective at either: As
 
White says, "...we cannot be engineers without knowing what to build.
 
"The ambiguity of Dewey about the possibility of setting up^a social
 
program without lapsing into dogmatism was one of the chief reasons for
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the defections from liberalism in the thirties."
 
Finally, there was the criticism of the analytic philos
 
ophers led, of course, by Bertrand Russell. Dewey preferred to use
 
.viords such as "judgment" or "warranted assertion," instead of "truth,"
 
as the end of inquiry. Thayer speculates that this was a direct re­
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suit of Russell's criticisms of James's conflicting notions of truth.
 
Dewey, Lewis and Mead had refined their inheritance of uncompleted
 
theory for twenty years and come up with a theory of inquiry, rather
 
than a theory of truth.
 
Russell's analytical refutation of pragmatism's"theory of
 
truth," such as it is, has become the paradigm ever since: (A) It can
 
never be known if a theory is true or false, because all of its
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eonsequences can never be known. (B) The same idea cani be both true
 
or false under different circumstances. (C) For reasons A and B, the
 
very pragmatic definition of truth can never be verified or known true:
 
thus, an infinite regress. , ^
 
Yet, this did not prove satisfactory; the pragmatists did
 
not claim any static "truths." Russell said, "I now come to what is
 
most distinctive in Dr. Dewey's logic, namely the emphasis upon inquiry
 
as opposed to truth or knowledge. Inquiry is not for him, as for most
 
8Q
philosophers, a search for truth; it is an independent activity...."
 
Russell simply could not abide the notion of inquiry apart from truth.
 
He ridiculed in every way he could the notion that, "Truth is not an
 
81
important concept in Dr. Dewey's logic."
 
Where Russell struck the mark with most of his readers was
 
in bringing up the relation between knowledge and concrete ends:
 
"Knowledge, if Dr. Dewey is right, cannot be any part of the ends of
 
life; it is merely a means to other satisfactions. ...For my part, I
 
believe that too great an emphasis upon the practical robs practice
 
Op
 
of its raison d'etre."
 
Russell even compares the similarities of Dewey's objectives
 
with those of Karl Marx. After quoting the essential passage from his
 
eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach--"philosophers have only interpreted the
 
world in various ways, but the real task is to alter it"--he says:
 
"Allowing for a certain difference in phraseology, this doctrine is
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essentially indistinguishable from instrumentalism."
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Thayer criticizes Russe!1's comparison of Dewey and Marx,
 
For Dewey, philosophic interpretations hay£
 
altered the world.... And for Dewey, as for any sane
 
thinker, the real problem is how to alter the world for
 
the better. But the method Dewey proposes for this pur
 
pose is to be found in the writings of Dewey, not in
 
those of Marx. (Emphasis Thayer).
 
Notice that Thayer is not denying Russell's basic assertion.
 
Rather, Dewey's Fabian method for bringing about change is different
 
from Marx's. Dewey had improved on James's Wi11 to Believe and, with
 
the help of Mead and Lewis, kept the method of pragmatic belief before
 
the public. Yet, it was not good enough on a practical level to re
 
main popular, and no analytic philosopher wants to be associated with
 
it. Asher Moore's criticism (noted above) best describes the feelings
 
of those who once sympathized with pragmatism.
 
Its 1egacies are the term "pragmatic;" the usage theory of
 
meaning that led to the third edition of Webster's Dictionary, the
 
operant conditioning theory of behaviorism, with all its implications
 
in social theory; a literal faith in "progress," almost to the point
 
of equating change with improvement; and, of course, the continuing
 
coRinitment to the new education. It is true that pragmatism cannot
 
take all the credit for these manifestations. The social sciences
 
had a hand in their formation as well. However, the philosophy of
 
pragmatism was the primary attempt ta unite them through a common
 
method and purpose. As such, it deserves the greatest share of the
 
credit. In perspective it can be seen as an early attempt to deal
 
with the advance of the social sdiences, especially the assimilation
 
of Darwinism. It did attempt to provide a directive influence, and
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that may explain why its legacies are Still so apparent: no other pre
 
scriptive or normative philosophy has been accepted to take its place.
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